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IN ACQUAINTANCE-RAPE CASES 
DAN M. KAHAN† 
This Article uses the theory of cultural cognition to examine the debate over 
rape-law reform.  “Cultural cognition” refers to the tendency of individuals to 
conform their perceptions of legally consequential facts to their defining group 
commitments.  Results of an original experimental study (N = 1500) confirmed 
the impact of cultural cognition on perceptions of fact in a controversial ac-
quaintance-rape case.  The major finding was that a hierarchical worldview, as 
opposed to an egalitarian one, inclined individuals to perceive that the defen-
dant reasonably understood the complainant as consenting to sex despite her 
repeated verbal objections.  The effect of hierarchy in inclining subjects to favor 
acquittal was greatest among women; this finding was consistent with the hypo-
thesis that hierarchical women have a distinctive interest in stigmatizing rape 
complainants whose behavior deviates from hierarchical gender norms.  The 
study also found that cultural predispositions have a much larger impact on 
outcome judgments than do legal definitions, variations in which had either a 
small or no impact on the likelihood that subjects would support or oppose con-
viction.  This Article links conflict over rape-law reform to a class of controver-
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sies that reflect symbolic status competition between opposing cultural groups, 
and it addresses the normative implications of this conclusion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Does “no” always mean “no” to sex?  More generally, what standards 
should the law use to evaluate whether a woman has genuinely con-
sented to sexual intercourse or whether she could reasonably have been 
understood by a man to have done so?  Or more basically still, how 
should the law define “rape”?  These questions have been points of con-
tention within and without the legal academy for over three decades.1 
The dispute concerns not just the content of the law but also the 
nature of social norms and the interaction of law and norms.  Accord-
ing to critics, the traditional and still dominant common law definition 
of rape—which requires proof of “force or threat of force” and which 
excuses a “reasonably mistaken” belief in consent—is founded on an-
tiquated expectations of male sexual aggression and female submis-
sion.2  Defenders of the common law reply that the traditional defini-
tion of rape sensibly accommodates contemporary practices and 
understandings—not only of men but of many women as well.  The 
statement “no,” they argue, does not invariably mean “no” but rather 
sometimes means “yes” or at least “maybe.”  Accordingly, making rape 
a strict-liability offense, or abolishing the need to show that the defen-
dant used “force or threat of force,” would result in the conviction of 
nonculpable defendants, restrict the sexual autonomy of women as well 
as men, and likely provoke the refusal of prosecutors, judges, and ju-
ries to enforce the law.3 
This Article describes original, experimental research pertinent to 
the “no means . . . ?” debate.  In both law journals and law school 
classrooms, that debate is frequently brought into sharp focus—and 
sharp contention—by examination of a controversial case, Common-
wealth v. Berkowitz.4  In an experimental study, a large and diverse na-
tional sample of adults reviewed the key facts in Berkowitz, including 
 
1 See generally SUSAN CARINGELLA, ADDRESSING RAPE REFORM IN LAW AND PRACTICE 
12-27 (2009) (chronicling the development of the rape-reform movement that began 
in the mid-1970s). 
2 See, e.g., JOANNA BOURKE, RAPE:  SEX, VIOLENCE, HISTORY 50-82, 389-99 (2007) 
(discussing the history and cultural understandings of rape, as well as the legal system’s 
current treatment of rape).  See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, 
Method, and the State:  Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 651-55 (1983) (discuss-
ing the connection between the ideology of male dominance and female subordination 
and the definition of rape). 
3 See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas III, Rapes Without Rapists:  Con-
sent and Reasonable Mistake, in SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 86, 107-09 
(Philosophical Issues vol. 11, Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva eds., 2001). 
4 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994). 
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the uncontested fact that the victim in the case repeatedly said “no” 
immediately before and during intercourse with the defendant.5  The 
subjects then indicated whether they believed the victim consented to 
sex or could reasonably have been understood to have done so by the 
defendant.  Subjects also indicated how they believed the case should 
be decided after being supplied with the common law definition of 
rape or with one of several reform alternatives.  The goal of the study 
was not merely to generate data on whether people perceive “no” as 
sometimes meaning “yes” to sex and on how different legal standards 
affect their willingness to convict a man of rape in a case presenting 
that question.  The study also aimed to connect the “no means . . . ?” 
debate to a psychologically realistic account of how and why people 
form such perceptions and make such judgments. 
“Cultural cognition” refers to the influence of group values on in-
dividuals’ perceptions of facts.6  The law often requires decisionmakers 
to infer facts they cannot directly observe:  states of mind, causal links, 
risks, and the like.  In such circumstances, individuals naturally gravi-
tate toward factual perceptions that reflect their group commitments.  
People who share formative identities tend to apprehend facts in a 
similar way in part because they are likely to be drawing on common 
life experiences when interpreting the significance of various events.  
But more importantly, such individuals face strong psychological pres-
sure to fit their perceptions of how the world does work to their shared 
appraisals of how the world should work:  forming beliefs at odds with 
their core values exposes them to dissonance and risks putting them in 
conflict with others whose opinions of them affect both their material 
and emotional well-being.7  As a result, even when individuals of di-
 
5 Id. at 1164. 
6 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 
24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2006) (defining “cultural cognition” as “the psycho-
logical disposition of persons to conform their factual beliefs about the instrumental 
efficacy (or perversity) of law to their cultural evaluations of the activities subject to 
regulation”); Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of Democra-
cy:  A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2006) (re-
viewing and criticizing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR:  BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE (2005), for its inattention to the phenomenon of cultural cognition). 
7 See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy:  The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on 
Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 821 (2003); Dan M. Kahan, Do-
nald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C.K. Mertz, Culture and Identity-Protective Cogni-
tion:  Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 
470 (2007) (introducing the theory of “identity-protective cognition” and arguing that 
individuals process information in a way that supports the beliefs associated with the 
groups to which they belong because challenges to such beliefs could hurt the individ-
uals’ well-being). 
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verse cultural values are exposed to the same sources of evidence—
eyewitness statements, expert opinions, and even videotaped record-
ings of key events—they can hear and see very different things.8 
The study found that exactly this dynamic is at work when individu-
als consider the evidence in a case like Berkowitz.  The question whether 
the putative victim in that case effectively conveyed consent or the lack 
of it depends on the answer to another question—who is being asked.  
Individuals who adhere to a largely traditional cultural style, one that 
prescribes highly differentiated gender roles and features a commit-
ment to hierarchical forms of authority and social organization more 
generally, are highly likely to believe that “no” did not mean “no” in 
Berkowitz.  In contrast, persons who subscribe to a more egalitarian cul-
tural style that denies the legitimacy of hierarchical forms of social or-
ganization, including those founded on gender, are much more likely 
to perceive that the complainant did not consent and that the defen-
dant knew that.  These competing perceptions cohere with opposing 
sets of norms and related scripts of sexual behavior, conformity to 
which apportions status within the cultural groups adhering to them. 
The influence of culture on individuals’ perceptions of fact is much 
stronger, the study found, than other factors that might be expected to 
affect the result in a case like Berkowitz.  One such factor is the legal de-
finition of rape.  Subjects who were instructed to apply a standard re-
flecting one or another “reform” definition of rape were not more likely 
to convict than were subjects instructed to apply the traditional common 
law definition—or than those who were not supplied with any definition 
of rape at all.  Subjects who were instructed that rape includes sex when 
a woman says “no”—regardless of what she might have meant to convey 
or what the man understood her to be communicating—were slightly 
more likely to convict.  But the size of this increase was relatively small 
compared to the impact of cultural predispositions on subjects who re-
ceived this or any other definition of rape. 
Gender also mattered much less than culture—or, more accurately, 
mattered only in conjunction with it.  Overall, women were no more or 
less likely to favor conviction than were men.  However, women who 
 
8 See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going 
to Believe?  Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838 
(2009) (using the varied responses to the online video posted in Scott v. Harris, 550 
U.S. 372 (2007), to suggest that people are psychologically inclined to interpret facts in 
a manner consistent with their group identity); see also Dan M. Kahan & Donald Bra-
man, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV 1, 3-5 (2008) (sug-
gesting that the political debate over self-defense should be attributed to individuals’ 
inclination to form beliefs that support their core values and group commitments). 
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subscribed to the hierarchical cultural style—particularly older women 
who did—were more inclined to form a pro-defendant view of the facts.  
This result also reflects cultural cognition.  Those who subscribe to tra-
ditional gender norms conceive of saying “no” but meaning “yes” as a 
strategy some women use to evade the stigma that these norms visit on 
women who engage in casual sex.  Women who have earned high 
group status by conspicuously conforming to these norms are the ones 
most threatened by the prospect that women who use this strategy will 
escape censure.  The former are thus the ones with the greatest psycho-
logical motivation to construe facts in a case like Berkowitz in a manner 
that focuses the condemnatory force of the law against women who can 
be depicted as saying “no” while meaning “yes.” 
The cultural-cognition account of who is likely to see “no” as 
meaning “yes,” and why, does not logically entail a particular resolu-
tion to the debate over how the law should define rape.  It does, how-
ever, cast considerable empirical doubt on the factual premises of cer-
tain normative arguments conventionally advanced within that debate. 
One such premise is that the traditional common law definition 
reflects a distinctively “male” point of view.  The “no means . . . ?” de-
bate does not pit men against women, but rather pits men and women 
who adhere to one cultural style against men and women who adhere 
to another.  Indeed, those with the greatest stake in preserving the 
law’s attentiveness to the possibility that women who say “no” might be 
merely feigning lack of consent are women whose cultural identities 
endow them with resentment of other women whose behavior they re-
gard as deviant and subversive. 
At the same time, the cultural-cognition account also weakens the 
claim that modifying the traditional elements of rape risks unjust pu-
nishment of men who reasonably rely on social convention.  Because 
of the strong tendency of individuals to conform their perceptions of 
fact to their cultural outlooks, legal definitions have relatively little 
impact on how actual cases are likely to be decided.  Accordingly, even 
in jurisdictions that adopt reforms aimed at making “no” mean “no” 
without qualification, men who have internalized norms that members 
of their own communities share are unlikely to be judged differently 
from what they had reason to expect.  The group that is likely to be 
most aggrieved by such a revision in the law consists of hierarchical 
women, whose concern is not with the impact that redefining rape law 
would have on their or anyone else’s conduct, but rather with the mes-
sage that such a redefinition would express about the norms on which 
their status depends. 
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For this reason, the primary normative issue posed by the cultural 
cognition of consent in acquaintance-rape cases is not behavioral but 
political.  As a result of the formative impact of cultural outlooks on 
their perceptions, people are unlikely to behave differently, and legal 
decisionmakers to decide cases differently, if a jurisdiction replaces the 
common law formulation of rape with one or another reform stan-
dard.  But precisely because individuals are conscious of the cultural 
significance of law, such reform is likely to be strongly advocated by 
those who want to overthrow traditional, stratified gender norms, and 
resisted by those who are committed to the same—all of whom will 
understand the stance the law takes as adjudicating the conflict be-
tween their worldviews.  In this sense, the “no means . . . ?” debate is 
akin to numerous other debates that present themselves as empirical 
in nature (e.g., whether the death penalty deters murder, whether 
gun-control laws reduce crime, and whether global warming is a se-
rious threat to human health and the environment) but that are at 
their essence expressive status conflicts between the adherents of 
competing cultural styles.9  How to respond to such issues goes to the 
core of whether the law should strike a posture of liberal neutrality 
and what doing so would require in light of individuals’ psychological 
disposition to impute harm to behavior that denigrates their visions of 
the best life and the ideal society.10 
This Article will develop these points in three Parts.  Part I uses the 
Berkowitz case to outline the “no means . . . ?” debate, identifying three 
distinct positions on how law and norms do and should interact in this 
area.  Part II describes the experimental study undertaken to address 
the key empirical premises of those positions.  Finally, Part III assesses 
the study’s descriptive and normative implications. 
I.  THE “NO MEANS . . . ?” DEBATE 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Ber-
kowitz11 furnishes an instructive focus for examining how the law re-
sponds to “acquaintance” or “date” rape.  The facts not only highlight 
those aspects of the law that (in the overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
 
9 For accounts of the nature of symbolic status competition in law, see JOSEPH  
R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE:  STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE 
MOVEMENT 1-24 (2d ed. 1986), and J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 
2313 (1997). 
10 See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 116-42 (2007).  
11 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994). 
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tions) make proof of nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a person 
who verbally resists—who says “no”—insufficient to convict a man of 
rape.  They also powerfully evoke the array of conflicting responses—
perceptual, emotional, moral, and political—that account for the endur-
ing debate over whether those features of the law should be changed. 
A.  Berkowitz 
1.  The Case 
The defendant, age twenty, and the complainant,12 age nineteen, 
were college sophomores.13  They shared a group of friends and had 
casually socialized with one another.14  One or more of their en-
counters had a sexual overtone originating, almost surreally, from a 
sexual-assault awareness lecture entitled, “Does ‘No’ Sometimes 
Mean ‘Yes’?” 
Among other things, the lecturer at this seminar had discussed the aver-
age length and circumference of human penises.  After the seminar, the 
victim and several of her friends had discussed the subject matter of the 
seminar over a speaker-telephone with appellant and his roommate 
Earl . . . . The victim testified that during that telephone conversation, 
she had asked appellant the size of his penis.  According to the victim, 
appellant responded by suggesting that the victim “come over and find 
out.”  She declined. 
 . . . [T]he victim testified that on two other occasions, she had 
stopped by appellant’s room while intoxicated.  During one of those 
times, she had laid down on his bed.  When asked whether she had asked 
appellant again at that time what his penis size was, the victim testified 
that she did not remember.
15
 
The critical events occurred some two weeks after the speaker-
phone conversation.  As summarized by the intermediate appellate 
court, the complainant testified that 
[a]t roughly 2:00 [i]n the afternoon . . . , after attending two morning 
classes, [she] returned to her dormitory room.  There, she drank a mar-
tini to “loosen up a little bit” before going to meet her boyfriend, with 
 
12 I use “complainant”—the term employed in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
opinion in Berkowitz and now identified by statute as the appropriate designation at tri-
al, see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3101 (2008)—rather than “victim” or “alleged victim,” as the 
latter have tendentious and distracting connotations. 
13 Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (per 
curiam), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994). 
14 Id. at 1339, 1341. 
15 Id. at 1341 (citations omitted). 
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whom she had argued the night before.  Roughly ten minutes later she 
walked to her boyfriend’s dormitory lounge to meet him.  He had not yet 
arrived. 
 Having nothing else to do while she waited for her boyfriend, the vic-
tim walked up to appellant’s room to look for Earl . . . . She knocked on 
the door several times but received no answer.  She therefore wrote a 
note . . . which read, “Hi Earl, I’m drunk.  That’s not why I came to see 
you.  I haven’t seen you in a while.  I’ll talk to you later, [victim’s name].”  
She did so, although she had not felt any intoxicating effects from the 
martini, “for a laugh.” 
 After the victim had knocked again, she tried the knob on the appel-
lant’s door.  Finding it open, she walked in.  She saw someone lying on 
the bed with a pillow over his head, whom she thought to be Earl . . . . Af-
ter lifting the pillow from his head, she realized it was appellant.  She 
asked appellant which dresser was his roommate’s.  He told her, and the 
victim left the note. 
 Before the victim could leave appellant’s room, however, appellant 
asked her to stay and “hang out for a while.”  She complied because she 
“had time to kill” and because she didn’t really know appellant and 
wanted to give him “a fair chance.”  Appellant asked her to give him a 
back rub but she declined, explaining that she did not “trust” him.  Ap-
pellant then asked her to have a seat on his bed.  Instead, she found a 
seat on the floor, and conversed . . . . [“[D]uring this conversation 
she . . . explained she was having problems with her boyfriend.”] 
 [After a few minutes, the defendant] moved off the bed and down on 
the floor, and “kind of pushed [the victim] back with his body.  It wasn’t 
a shove, it was just kind of a leaning-type of thing.”  Next appellant 
“straddled” and started kissing the victim.  The victim responded by say-
ing, “Look, I gotta go. I’m going to meet [my boyfriend].”  Then appel-
lant lifted up her shirt and bra and began fondling her.  The victim then 
said “no.” 
 After roughly thirty seconds of kissing and fondling, appellant “undid 
his pants and he kind of moved his body up a little bit.”  The victim was 
still saying “no” but “really couldn’t move because [appellant] was shift-
ing at [her] body so he was over [her].”  Appellant then tried to put his 
penis in her mouth.  The victim did not physically resist, but rather con-
tinued to verbally protest, saying “No, I gotta go, let me go,” in a “scold-
ing” manner. 
 Ten or fifteen more seconds passed before the two rose to their feet.  
Appellant disregarded the victim’s continual complaints that she “had to 
go,” and instead walked two feet away to the door and locked it so that no 
one from the outside could enter.  [“The victim testified that she realized 
at the time that the lock was not of a type that could lock people inside 
the room.”] 
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 Then, in the victim’s words, “[appellant] put me down on the bed.  It 
was kind of like—he didn’t throw me on the bed.  It’s hard to explain.  It 
was kind of like a push but no . . . .”  She did not bounce off the bed.  “It 
wasn’t slow like a romantic kind of thing, but it wasn’t a fast shove either.  
It was kind of in the middle.” 
 Once the victim was on the bed, appellant began “straddling” her 
again while he undid the knot in her sweatpants.  He then removed her 
sweatpants and underwear from one of her legs.  The victim did not phys-
ically resist in any way while on the bed because appellant was on top of 
her, and she “couldn’t like go anywhere.”  She did not scream out at any-
time because, “[i]t was like a dream was happening or something.” 
 Appellant then used one of his hands to “guide” his penis into her va-
gina.  At that point, after appellant was inside her, the victim began say-
ing “no, no to him softly in a moaning kind of way . . . because it was just 
so scary.”  After about thirty seconds, appellant pulled out his penis and 
ejaculated onto the victim’s stomach. 
 Immediately thereafter, appellant got off the victim and said, “Wow, I 
guess we just got carried away.”  To this the victim retorted, “No, we 
didn’t get carried away, you got carried away.”  The victim then quickly 
dressed, grabbed her school books and raced downstairs to her boyfriend 
who was by then waiting for her in the lounge. 
 Once there, the victim began crying.  Her boyfriend and she went up 
to his dorm room where, after watching the victim clean off appellant’s 
semen from her stomach, he called the police.
16
 
The defendant testified in his own behalf.  He admitted that he 
did 
initiate the first physical contact, but added that the victim warmly re-
sponded to his advances by passionately returning his kisses.  He con-
ceded that she was continually “whispering . . . no’s,” but claimed that 
she did so while “amorously . . . passionately” moaning.  In effect, he took 
such protests to be thinly-veiled acts of encouragement. When asked why 
he locked the door, he explained that “that’s not something you want 
somebody to just walk in on you [doing.]” 
 According to appellant, the two then laid down on the bed, the victim 
helped him take her clothing off, and he entered her.  He agreed that 
the victim continued to say “no” while on the bed, but carefully qualified 
his agreement, explaining that the statements were “moaned passionate-
ly.”  According to appellant, when he saw a “blank look on her face,”  
he immediately withdrew and asked “is anything wrong, is something  
the matter, is anything wrong.”  He ejaculated on her stomach  
thereafter because he could no longer “control” himself.  Appellant testi-
fied that after this, the victim “saw that it was over and then she made her 
 
16 Id. at 1339, 1340 & nn.1-2 (some alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
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move.  She gets right off the bed . . . she just swings her legs over and 
then she puts her clothes back on.”  Then, in wholly corroborating an as-
pect of the victim’s account, he testified that he remarked, “Well, I guess 
we got carried away,” to which she rebuked, “No, we didn’t get carried, 
you got carried away.”
17
 
The defendant was charged with rape.  Consistent with the common 
law, Pennsylvania law defined rape as “sexual intercourse with another 
person not his spouse:  (1) by forcible compulsion; [or] (2) by threat of 
forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of rea-
sonable resolution.”18  The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the de-
fendant was sentenced to a term of one to four years.19 
The conviction was overturned on appeal.  Affirming a decision by 
the intermediate appellate court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
concluded in a unanimous decision that the evidence at trial was insuf-
ficient to support a finding of “forcible compulsion.”20  The court noted 
that the complainant “agreed that Appellee’s hands were not restrain-
ing her in any manner during the actual penetration, and that the 
weight of his body on top of her was the only force applied.”21  “She tes-
tified that at no time did Appellee verbally threaten her,” the court 
continued, and “the record clearly demonstrates that the door could be 
unlocked easily from the inside, that she was aware of this fact, but that 
she never attempted to go to the door or unlock it.”22  “As to the com-
plainant’s testimony that she stated ‘no’ throughout the encounter,” 
the court reasoned, “such an allegation of fact would be relevant to the 
issue of consent, [but] it is not relevant to the issue of force.”23 
Nevertheless, the court found the evidence sufficient for convic-
tion of the defendant on the lesser offense of “indecent assault.”24  In-
decent assault required proof that a person engaged in “indecent con-
tact”—“[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of 
[another] person”25—“without the consent of the other person.”26  
 
17 Id. at 1341 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
18 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(a)(1)-(2) (West 1983).  See generally 2 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 17.1(a), at 605-06 (2d ed. 2003) (providing an 
overview of the common law definition of rape). 
19 609 A.2d at 1341-42. 
20 Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1165 (Pa. 1994). 
21 Id. at 1164. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 1166. 
25 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (West 1983). 
26 Id. § 3126(1), amended by Act of Feb. 2, 1990, 1990 Pa. Laws 6, 8. 
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“Appellee himself,” the court reasoned, “testified to the ‘indecent con-
tact.’”27  Further, “the jury reasonably could have inferred that the vic-
tim did not consent to the indecent contact” from her undisputed tes-
timony that “she repeatedly said ‘no’ throughout the encounter.”28  
Accordingly, the defendant’s conduct satisfied the elements of inde-
cent assault notwithstanding the absence of “forcible compulsion.”29  
For this offense—a misdemeanor under Pennsylvania law—the defen-
dant received a sentence of six to twelve months; he was ultimately pa-
roled after the minimum time served.30 
2.  The Controversy 
The topic of “acquaintance” or “date” rape had been a matter of 
intense political controversy for the better part of two decades by the 
time Berkowitz was decided.31  Women’s rights groups argued that 
women were being punished for the exercise of sexual autonomy by 
laws and attitudes that licensed men to impose unwanted sex on wom-
en who engaged in supposedly “suggestive” behavior or who had en-
gaged in consensual sexual relations on other occasions with other 
men.32  The advocacy efforts of these groups led to legal reforms, in-
cluding the near-universal adoption of “rape shield” evidentiary provi-
sions, which prohibit rape defendants from introducing evidence of a 
woman’s sexual history.33  In some states, legislatures amended the de-
finition of rape, although usually in ways that were ambiguous.34  Such 
 
27 641 A.2d at 1166. 
28 Id.  The court also affirmed the trial court’s ruling excluding evidence that the 
source of the difficulty between the victim and her boyfriend was the victim’s alleged 
infidelity.  See id. at 1165-66 (holding that the Rape Shield Law was “specifically de-
signed to protect victims” from “precisely th[at] type of allegation”). 
29 Id. at 1166. 
30 See Mike Frassinelli & Mario F. Cattabiani, Student in Controversy Paroled, MORN-
ING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Feb. 1, 1995, at A1, available at 1995 WL 1984672 (reporting 
the release of the defendant after six months served). 
31 See generally STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX:  THE CULTURE OF INTIMI-
DATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 29-46 (1998) (describing reform efforts and debates 
from the mid-1970s onward). 
32 See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation:  Rape Cases in the Court-
room, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22-32 (1977) (reviewing the negative effects of common 
myths and stereotypes about female sexuality on both social attitudes and judicial 
treatment of rape victims). 
33 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412. 
34 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 31, at 30-33 (summarizing reforms aimed at modify-
ing the resistance requirement and at shifting emphasis from consent (a subjective 
state of mind) to “forcible compulsion” (an objective measure), but concluding that 
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hedging might well have been a deliberate response to the resistance 
that demands for reform also provoked.  Social conservatives dismissed 
concern over date rape as a species of political correctness aimed at 
obliterating gender differentiation in social roles; a small group of ec-
lectic feminists also dissented, arguing that the agitation over date 
rape was conditioning women to accept a disempowering “victim-
hood” identity.35  Singled out for particular, and particularly effective, 
ridicule were campus sexual-conduct codes, such as Antioch College’s, 
which required explicit verbal confirmation of consent at each “stage” 
of sexual activity (kissing, removal of clothing, touching of breasts, 
contact with genitals, and so forth).36 
The decision in Berkowitz incited a predictable clash between those 
on both sides of the date-rape divide.  Excoriating the “all-male Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court,”37 women’s rights advocates characterized the rul-
ing as “one of the worst setbacks for the sexual assault movement in the 
last several years.”38  “What is it about the word ‘no’ they don’t under-
stand?” critics of the decision asked.39  “Obviously the court has a difficult 
time comprehending the most unambiguous word in the English lan-
guage. . . . Almost anyone would agree [the victim] had been raped.”40 
But in truth, not everyone did.  Some denied Berkowitz was “even 
remotely about rape.”41  “Oh, please,” commented date-rape skeptic 
 
“even when reform statutes seemed to protect women from sex without their consent, 
force almost always reentered the picture”).  
35 See, e.g., CAMILLE PAGLIA, Op-Ed., Rape and Modern Sex War, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 
27, 1991, reprinted in SEX, ART, AND AMERICAN CULTURE 49, 49-50 (1992); KATIE 
ROIPHE, The Rape Crisis, or “Is Dating Dangerous?”, reprinted in THE MORNING AFTER:  SEX, 
FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 51, 56-84 (1st ed. 1993); CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, 
WHO STOLE FEMINISM?  HOW WOMEN HAVE BETRAYED WOMEN 242-46 (1994). 
36 See Mark Cowling, Rape, Communicative Sexuality and Sex Education (reproducing 
and critiquing the Antioch College Sexual Offense Policy), in MAKING SENSE OF SEXUAL 
CONSENT 17, 19-23 (Mark Cowling & Paul Reynolds eds., 2004). 
37 Robin Abcarian, When a Woman Just Says “No,” L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1994, at B10; 
see also Editorial, Redefine Rape Law So that No Means No, Hartford Courant, June 5, 1994, 
at D2, available at 1994 WL 4527718 (“In a ruling that can only be called outrageous, 
the all-male Pennsylvania Supreme Court held unanimously that a woman who merely 
says ‘no’ is not a rape victim . . . .”). 
38 Dale Russakoff, Where Women Can’t Just Say “No,” WASH. POST, June 3, 1994, at A1 
(quoting Cassandra Thomas, President, Nat’l Coal. Against Sexual Assault). 
39 Editorial, When “No” Means Nothing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 6, 1994, at 
6B, available at 1994 WLNR 705949 (quoting Deborah Zubow, Women’s Int’l League 
for Peace and Freedom in Phila.). 
40 Id.  
41 Nancy E. Roman, Scales of Justice Weigh Tiers of Sexual Assault; State May Reform 
Rape Law, WASH. TIMES, June 16, 1994, at A8, available at 1994 WLNR 231421 (quoting 
Camille Paglia, Professor, Univ. of the Arts). 
15 KAHAN FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2010  6:10 PM 
742 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 729 
Camille Paglia, “she goes into the room of a man who’s in bed and sits 
on the floor with her breasts sticking up:  What are we teaching our 
girls? . . . When you go into a man’s room and stretch on the floor, you 
are sending a signal.”42  Other commentators described Berkowitz as 
representative of a class of “cases where there has been some over-
reaching, disrespect and abuse, but not the overwhelming life-
threatening violence we think of traditionally in rape cases.”43 
The Pennsylvania legislature responded to this controversy exactly 
as one might predict:  by ducking it.44  After a year of debate, the legis-
lature made two changes to the state’s criminal code.  The first ex-
pressly defined “forcible compulsion” for purposes of rape:  “Compul-
sion by use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological 
force, either express or implied.  The term includes, but is not limited 
to, compulsion resulting in another person’s death, whether the death 
occurred before, during or after sexual intercourse.”45  The second 
change added the new offense of “sexual assault,” which was defined 
simply as “sexual intercourse . . . with a complainant without the com-
plainant’s consent.”46  This offense was graded as a second-degree fe-
lony and made punishable by a maximum term of ten years’ impri-
sonment47—a penalty in between the twenty-year maximum for rape 
and the two-year maximum for indecent contact.48 
One could view these changes as effectively overruling Berkowitz.  
Under this reading, the extension of “forcible compulsion” to “moral, 
emotional or psychological force” could be seen as permitting a rape 
conviction even when, as in Berkowitz, the defendant did not use or 
threaten to use physical force to overcome the victim’s resistance.  
Moreover, even if a jury could not be induced to find such a man guilty 
of rape, the new legislation assured he would still be found guilty of a 
serious felony—“sexual assault”—rather than a mere misdemeanor. 
Alternatively, one could view the legislation as effectively codifying 
Berkowitz.  The new statutory definition of “forcible compulsion” mir-
 
42 Id. 
43 Tamar Lewin, Courts Struggle over How Much Force It Takes to Be a Rape, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 3, 1994, at B8 (quoting Stephen Schulhofer, Professor, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.). 
44 See generally Theresa A. McNamara, Comment, Act 10:  Remedying Problems of Penn-
sylvania’s Rape Laws or Revisiting Them?, 101 DICK. L. REV. 203 (1996) (describing the 
legislative history of post-Berkowitz reforms and the new legislation’s ambiguity). 
45 Act of Mar. 31, 1995, 1995 Pa. Laws 985, 985 (codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 3101 (2008)). 
46 Id. at 987 (codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3124.1). 
47 Id. (codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 106(b)(3), 3124.1). 
48 See id. at 986, 989 (codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 106(b), 3121, 3126(b)). 
15 KAHAN FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2010  6:10 PM 
2010] Culture, Cognition, and Consent 743 
rored one that existed in Pennsylvania Supreme Court case law predat-
ing Berkowitz.49  If Berkowitz himself had not engaged in “forcible 
compulsion” as that court defined the term, why treat statutory absorp-
tion of that definition as permitting conviction of anyone who thereaf-
ter behaved as he did?  Had the Pennsylvania legislature wanted to as-
sure such a result, it could have done so unambiguously by eliminating 
the element of “forcible compulsion” altogether and by expressly indi-
cating that proof of intercourse with a woman who says “no” is suffi-
cient for proof of rape. 
Indeed, because the legislature declined to indicate that such 
proof vitiates any inference of “consent,” it left open a possible route 
of escape from liability even for the new “sexual assault” felony:  rea-
sonable mistake.  In many states, the prosecution must show that the de-
fendant knew or reasonably should have known that the complainant 
did not consent; a reasonable mistake is therefore a defense.50  Such a 
defense might be of little practical consequence if the state is already 
obliged to prove force or threat of force:  a man shown to have re-
sponded to a woman’s resistance by resort to physical intimidation is 
not likely to be believed if he claims he honestly perceived the woman 
was feigning lack of consent, much less be given credit for reasonably 
perceiving that.  But a man who overcomes professed verbal resistance 
to sex without force or threat of force might be credited, if the fact-
finders themselves believe that women do sometimes say “no” when 
they are interested in sex.  Accordingly, by (arguably) diluting the 
“forcible compulsion” element of rape and by dispensing with force 
altogether for “sexual assault,” the post-Berkowitz reforms (arguably) 
increased the importance of assuring that such a mistake is under-
stood to excuse a man from liability.  Or so reasoned both the su-
preme-court-appointed drafters of Pennsylvania’s standard jury in-
structions and the state’s intermediate appellate court in a case after 
the reforms were enacted.51 
 
49 See Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (construing “forc-
ible compulsion” as including “not only physical force or violence but also moral, psy-
chological or intellectual force”). 
50 See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1345 (Cal. 1975); State v. Smith, 554 
A.2d 713, 717 (Conn. 1989); State v. Koperski, 578 N.W.2d 837, 846 (Neb. 1998).  In 
contrast, some states do not require proof of any mental state with respect to consent.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 964-67 (Mass. 2001). 
51 The court quoted with approval the drafters’ Subcommittee Note explaining 
that,  
In the opinion of the Subcommittee there may be cases, especially now that 
[forcible compulsion has been] extended . . . to psychological, moral and in-
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Pacified, the antagonists in the Berkowitz controversy withdrew.  But 
as a succession of similar controversies attests,52 the debate over the 
significance the law should afford the word “no” has by no means been 
definitively resolved.53 
 
tellectual force, where a defendant might non-recklessly or even reasonably, 
but wrongly, believe that his words and conduct do not constitute force or the 
threat of force and that a non-resisting female is consenting.  An example 
might be “date rape” resulting from mutual misunderstanding.  The boy does 
not intend or suspect the intimidating potential of his vigorous wooing.  The 
girl, misjudging the boys’ [sic] character, believes he will become violent if 
thwarted; she feigns willingness, even some pleasure.  In our opinion the de-
fendant in such a case ought not to be convicted of rape. 
Commonwealth v. Fischer, 721 A.2d 1111, 1117-18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (quoting Sub-
committee Note, Pa. Suggested Standard Crim. Jury Instructions § 15.3121A).  The 
court continued, 
It is clear that the Subcommittee gave extensive thought to the ever-changing 
law of sexual assault and our understanding of sexual behavior in modern 
times.  We agree with the Subcommittee that the rule in [Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 439 A.2d 765 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982),] is inappropriate in the type of date 
rape case described above.  Changing codes of sexual conduct, particularly 
those exhibited on college campuses, may require that we give greater weight 
to what is occurring beneath the overt actions of young men and women.  
Recognition of those changes, in the form of specified jury instructions [re-
quiring acquittal of a reasonably mistaken defendant], strikes us an appropri-
ate course of action. 
Id. at 1118. 
 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has also concluded that lack of force can still be 
relevant—-extremely so—to the determination of whether a woman genuinely did not 
consent in a case in which she engaged only in verbal resistance.  See Commonwealth v. 
Prince, 719 A.2d 1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).  The defendant in Prince had been 
convicted of sexual assault but acquitted of rape for engaging in sex with his ex-wife de-
spite her verbal resistance and screams of “stop” and “[y]ou’re hurting me” made loud-
ly enough to be “heard by her next door neighbor.”  Id. at 1088-89.  Characterizing the 
case as “obviously . . . close on the issue of consent,” the court stated that it was “imper-
ative that the jury be instructed clearly and definitively as to where the burden lay on 
the issue of consent” in sexual assault cases.  Id. at 1090. 
52 See, e.g., Barbara Brotman, Campus Debate:  At the University of Iowa, an Assault Case 
Has Raised Questions About Sex, Drinking and the Meaning of the Word “No,” CHI. TRIB., 
Dec. 18, 2002, § 8, at 1 (reporting on the campus controversy over a date-rape allega-
tion); Jim Hughes, Adam Thompson & Rick Baca, Controversy Builds in CU Rape Case, 
DENVER POST, May 3, 2002, at B1, available at 2002 WLNR 478017 (reporting on the 
controversy surrounding an allegation of date rape and counterallegations of racial 
stereotyping in a case involving African-American football players); Ben Eisen, A  
Rape Case That’s Not Going Away, INSIDE HIGHER ED, June 19, 2009, http:// 
www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/06/19/assault (describing the controversy sur-
rounding, among other things, a university spokesperson charactering the allegation of 
rape against student athletes as that of “date rape” rather than “outright rape”).  
53 Compare Posting of Gregg Easterbrook to Easterblogg, “No” Does Not Always Mean 
No; Time to Agree on a Phrase That Does (Oct. 9, 2003) (on file with author) (“[T]he reali-
ty of human interaction is that ‘no’ does not always mean no.  Maybe half the sex in 
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B.  Law and Norms:  Three Positions 
Berkowitz furnishes a textbook treatment (literally) of standard doc-
trine.54  Under the still-dominant common law definition of rape, 
proof that a man engaged in vaginal intercourse with a woman without 
her consent is legally necessary but not sufficient for conviction.  The 
prosecution must show in addition that the man overcame the will of 
the victim by “force or threat of force.”55  Force is defined as behavior, 
extrinsic to the act of sexual penetration, that overcomes resistance on 
the part of the victim.56  Such resistance, moreover, must be physical, 
not merely verbal.57  Absent physical resistance, then, there can be no 
conviction for rape, unless the prosecution shows that the man in-
duced passive acquiescence by “threat of force,” which is defined as 
behavior that would put a woman in “reasonable fear” of physical in-
jury.58  Merely engaging in intercourse with a woman who does not 
consent and who says—repeatedly, loudly, even in tears—“no” is not 
rape under this account of the doctrine.59 
Accordingly, the debate among legal commentators, at least, is less 
about whether Berkowitz was correctly decided than about whether the 
standard definition of rape that it enforced should be changed.  These 
arguments can be synthesized into three positions:  the standard fe-
minist (or simply “standard”) critique of the common law; the conven-
tionalist defense of it; and the norm-reconstruction program. 
 
world history has followed an initial ‘no,’ or more than one ‘no.’ . . . What ends up as 
consensual sex, however unsatisfying, often begins with the woman saying ‘no.’”), and 
Page Rockwell, No More “No Means No”?, SALON, Mar. 11, 2006, http://www.salon.com/ 
mwt/broadsheet/2006/03/10/no/print.html (reporting a roundtable discussion in 
which participants agreed that “‘no means no’ is too reductive”), with Dahlia Lithwick, 
No:  “No Means No” Is Still a Pretty Good Rule, SLATE, Oct. 10, 2003, http://www.slate.com/ 
id/2089687 (taking issue with commentator Gregg Easterbrook’s argument that proof 
of nonconsent must involve more than verbal resistance “because in the real world ‘no’ 
does not always mean no” (quoting Easterbrook, supra)). 
54 See, e.g., KATE E. BLOCH & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW:  A CONTEMPO-
RARY APPROACH 593 (2005) (using an excerpt of Berkowitz as a hypothetical); JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 423-32 (4th ed. 2007) (including 
Berkowitz in the discussion of rape); JAY M. FEINMAN, LAW 101, at 300-01 (2d ed. 2006) 
(same); MATTHEW LIPPMAN, CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL LAW:  CONCEPTS, CASES, AND 
CONTROVERSIES 341-42 (2007) (same). 
55 LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 17.1(a), at 605. 
56 See id. § 17.1(a), at 606, § 17.4(a), at 639-40. 
57 See id. § 17.4(a), at 640. 
58 See id. § 17.3(b), at 624-26. 
59 See, e.g., State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 475-76 (N.C. 1984) (holding that an ab-
sence of force defeats a rape conviction despite the victim having clearly articulated a 
lack of consent). 
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The standard critique links the common law definition of rape to 
stereotypes of male and female sexuality.  Men, under this view, are 
depicted as naturally impelled by strong and near-continuous sexual 
urges.  Women, in contrast, are thought to be ambivalent:  they are 
normally uninterested in sex but aroused by aggressive sexual pursuit.  
Thus, a man who stubbornly persists despite signs, including verbal 
ones, that a woman does not desire sex is not acting abnormally; in-
deed, he is displaying exactly the sort of virility necessary to stimulate a 
normal woman’s interest and pleasure.60  Accordingly, the “force or 
threat of force” element excludes this sort of badgering, which is ex-
pected to be commonplace in ordinary sexual relationships, from the 
definition of rape.61 
The sort of aberrational conduct that is encompassed by the com-
mon law definition usually occurs outside such relationships—typically, 
in fact, between strangers.  In this situation, a man resorts to violence 
to obtain sex from a woman because he has no reason to think she will 
be aroused by his entreaties, however persistent.  On the contrary, the 
ordinary rapist usually has good reason to know that the victim should 
not find his aggression arousing.  Rape, according to the standard fe-
 
60 See generally BOURKE, supra note 2, at 67-76 (2007) (examining various examples 
of this understanding in popular media and in other nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
sources). 
61 See MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 649 (“The law . . . adjudicat[es] the level of ac-
ceptable force starting just above the level set by what is seen as normal male sexual 
behavior, rather than at the victim’s, or women’s, point of violation.”).  As one account 
that reflects the common law attitude put it, 
[W]here the circumstances of the encounter differ from the stereotyped at-
tack—-as when the parties were previously acquainted, perhaps to the extent of 
a “dating” relationship, and the encounter occurred in an apartment to which 
they both went willingly-—one cannot so easily assume the woman’s attitude of 
opposition.  Here, the behavior of both parties must be more heavily relied on 
to evince the woman’s attitude toward the act.  The woman’s behavior ordina-
rily may be an accurate guide to her attitude.  But sometimes the behavior, 
controlled by personality forces other than those which determine the con-
sciously perceived attitude, will contradict the woman’s self-perceived disposi-
tion toward the act.  When her behavior looks like resistance although her atti-
tude is one of consent, injustice may be done the man by the woman’s 
subsequent accusation.  Many women, for example, require as a part of prelim-
inary “love play” aggressive overtures by the man.  Often their erotic pleasure 
may be enhanced by, or even depend upon, an accompanying physical strug-
gle.  The “love bite” is a common, if mild, sign of the aggressive component in 
the sex act.  And the tangible signs of struggle may survive to support a subse-
quent accusation by the woman. 
Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape:  An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the 
Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 66 (1952) (footnotes omitted). 
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minist critique, is conceived of not as a violation of female sexual au-
tonomy but as a usurpation of male prerogative—perhaps that of a 
woman’s husband to exclusive sexual access or of men of appropriate 
social credentials (e.g., of a particular race) to seek such access to a 
particular unmarried woman.62 
The standard critique views the common law of rape, so explained, 
as one means by which the state enforces male domination of wom-
en.63  The understandings that inform the common law formulation 
reflect not women’s actual desires but rather the desires men impute 
to women to rationalize control over women’s sex lives.64  As a result of 
the reciprocal action of the law and these rationalizations on one 
another, “women are . . . violated every day by men who have no idea 
of the meaning of their acts to women.  To them, it is sex.  Therefore, 
to the law, it is sex.  That is the single reality of what happened.”65 
The law indulges male sexual aggression not just through the 
“force or threat of force” element but also through the reasonable-
mistake defense.  Because “men are systematically conditioned not 
even to notice what women want,” the law views it as reasonable for 
men to perceive consent even when women plainly do not intend to 
convey it66—indeed, even when, as in Berkowitz, they plainly tell them, 
“no,” they do not want to have sex.  “Thus do legal doctrines, incohe-
rent or puzzling as syllogistic logic, become coherent as ideology.”67 
Or so says the standard critique; according to the conventionalist 
defense, it’s the claim that the common law reflects a “male point of 
view”68 that is ideologically motivated.  The reality, according to the 
 
62 See MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 644 (“To the extent possession is the point of 
sex, rape is sex with a woman who is not yours, unless the act is so as to make her 
yours.”); id. at 647 (“[R]ape, as legally defined, appears more a crime against female 
monogamy than against female sexuality.”); id. at 653 (“[M]en . . . define rape as they 
imagine the sexual violation of women through distinguishing it from their image of 
what they normally do . . . . So rape comes to mean a strange (read Black) man know-
ing a woman does not want sex and going ahead anyway.”). 
63 See id. at 655 (discussing how the ideal of “man initiates, woman chooses” favors 
men); see also JOAN MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE?  ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING 
WOMEN’S CONSENT SERIOUSLY 62-63 (2005) (noting that rape law assumes an inherent 
degree of male force). 
64 See MCGREGOR, supra note 63, at 197-98; Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded:  On 
Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 381, 395-97 (2005) (explaining how 
men may deceive themselves regarding women’s true sexual desires). 
65 MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 652-53. 
66 Id. at 653. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 655. 
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conventionalists, is that “no” does not always mean “no” in the minds 
of women either.69  Studies of college-aged women, they point out, 
show that a substantial proportion—approximately 40%—report hav-
ing engaged in “token resistance,” or saying “no” to sex even though 
they “had every intention to and were willing to engage in sexual in-
tercourse.”70  In one such study, “68.5% of the total sample reported 
saying no when they meant maybe.”71  Still other studies have reported 
that majorities of college-aged women communicate interest in sexual 
intercourse through “indirect” or “nonverbal” cues such as “offer[ing] 
the man a drink, invit[ing] the man to a private place that has a ro-
mantic ambience,”72 or, after initiation of sexual activity, “failing to res-
ist genital fondling.”73  Popular reaction against the Antioch Code, 
which continues to evoke professions of incredulity when proposed to 
sexually active young adults,74 confirms that express verbal permission 
is alien to contemporary conventions for expressing consent to sexual 
intercourse. 
On this view, the common law definition of rape appropriately ac-
commodates these conventions.  Because “women sometimes say ‘no’ 
when they hope the man will continue,” a man can be uncertain about 
a woman’s intentions when she verbally indicates nonconsent but oth-
er circumstances (e.g., an invitation to be alone in her apartment, the 
 
69 See Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas III, Date Rape, Social Convention, and 
Reasonable Mistakes, 11 LAW & PHIL. 95, 122 (1992) [hereinafter Husak & Thomas, Date 
Rape] (explaining that some women often say “no” for fear of creating a promiscuous 
image); Husak & Thomas, supra note 3, at 95-96. 
70 Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Carie S. Rodgers, Token Resistance to Sex:  New Pers-
pectives on an Old Stereotype, 22 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 443, 444 (1998) (italics omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Husak & Thomas, Date Rape, supra note 69, 
at 122; Husak & Thomas, supra note 3, at 96.  For examples of such studies, see Char-
lene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When They Mean 
Yes?  The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 873-74 (1988); Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Marcia L. McCoy, 
Double Standard/Double Bind:  The Sexual Double Standard and Women’s Communication 
About Sex, 15 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 447, 457-58 (1991); and Susan Sprecher et al., Token 
Resistance to Sexual Intercourse and Consent to Unwanted Sexual Intercourse:  College Students’ 
Dating Experiences in Three Countries, 31 J. SEX RES. 125, 127-31 (1994). 
71 Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 70, at 874. 
72 Husak & Thomas, Date Rape, supra note 69, at 116-17. 
73 Husak & Thomas, supra note 3, at 94. 
74 See Terry P. Humphreys, Understanding Sexual Consent:  An Empirical Investigation 
of the Normative Script for Young Heterosexual Adults (“When presented with the Antioch 
sexual consent policy statement, the majority of both males and females [in the Cana-
dian study] responded that they were against the rigidity of a formal policy which dic-
tated personal sexual behaviour . . . .”), in MAKING SENSE OF SEXUAL CONSENT, supra 
note 36, at 209, 219. 
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couple’s consumption of alcohol, willing engagement in  
foreplay) convey her interest in sexual intercourse.75  In such a situa-
tion, it is consistent with social expectations for a man who has not en-
gaged in threatening behavior to interpret the lack of physical resis-
tance to continued sexual contact (kissing, touching, genital contact, 
and finally penetration) as a reliable confirmation of consent.  The 
“force or threat of force” element, on this account, thus draws the line 
exactly where convention places it.76 
Of course, because the conventions used to communicate consent 
are inherently ambiguous, it is possible that a man who treats a wom-
an’s actions, or lack of them, as a truer representation of her desires 
than her words will be mistaken as to consent.  But if under the totality 
of the circumstances others would concur that he construed her beha-
vior consistently with the cues “by which women actually express their 
agreements to have sex in the real world,” he cannot be deemed mo-
rally culpable for his actions.77  In that case, the reasonable-mistake de-
fense appropriately shields him from criminal liability.78 
Critics of the conventionalist position offer a number of re-
sponses.  One is simple denial of its empirical premise.  The token-
resistance studies, some argue, suggest that the proportion of women 
who have stated “no” when they mean “yes” is too small to justify cha-
racterizing this form of verbal misdirection as a “convention” or to 
make it reasonable, statistically, for a man to assume that “no” means 
anything other than “no” on a particular occasion.79  Others question 
whether responses obtained in the questionnaires used to compile da-
ta on the incidence of token resistance can be reliably interpreted.80  It 
is unclear, for example, how closely the forms of indirection in which 
the respondents reported having engaged resembled the facts in Ber-
kowitz.  The studies, moreover, are old:  none seems to have been con-
ducted in the last decade. 
 
75 Husak & Thomas, supra note 3, at 96. 
76 See Husak & Thomas, Date Rape, supra note 69, at 123-24. 
77 Id. at 95. 
78 See Husak & Thomas, supra note 3, at 87 (“[C]riminal law typically recognizes 
that persons who make reasonable mistakes of fact that rebut mens rea are not subject 
to punishment.” (emphasis omitted)). 
79 See, e.g., MCGREGOR, supra note 63, at 209-12 (arguing that such an approach 
“does not guard against the statistically large number of times that women are genuine-
ly not consenting to sex”). 
80 See, e.g., Muehlenhard & Rodgers, supra note 70, at 448-51 (casting doubt upon 
previous studies by presenting data showing that respondents’ narratives evinced a mis-
understanding of the definition of token resistance). 
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The norm-reconstruction program, in contrast, accepts that token 
resistance has an enduring empirical basis—and is a source of poten-
tial confusion when men interpret women’s intentions81—but denies 
that this practice justifies the common law definition of rape.  It’s true, 
the adherents to this position concede, that some women find it satis-
fying to engage in verbal misdirection of their sexual intentions.82  But 
as the token-resistance studies show, a significant fraction of sexually 
active women don’t engage in this behavior; when they say “no,” they 
always mean “no.”  Women who refrain from the practice of token re-
sistance are endangered by the behavior of women who engage in it 
because of the risk this practice creates in that men will genuinely mis-
understand the intentions of women who say “no” and mean it—or 
that men will strategically exploit the disposition of others to credit 
specious claims of mistake.  In this conflict, the law should side with 
the interests of the women who eschew token resistance.  The benefit 
that women who participate in token resistance obtain from it, the 
norm reformers argue, is of insufficient social value to outweigh the 
harm suffered when women’s genuine lack of consent is ignored. 
Rather than passively reflect the norms underlying token resistance, 
then, the law should attack and change them.  In the crime of rape, 
“‘[c]onsent’ should be defined so that no means no. . . . As for intent, 
unreasonableness as to consent, understood to mean ignoring a woman’s 
words, should be sufficient for liability.”83  “The challenge we face in 
thinking about rape is to use the legitim[at]ing power of law to rein-
force what is best, not what is worst, in our changing sexual mores.”84   
The conventionalists resist the norm-reconstructionist position, 
too.  Because the “no means yes” script is “deeply embedded” in the 
expectations of men and women, “[t]here is bound to be a considera-
ble lag between the time a law is passed and the time that conduct ac-
tually changes.”85  During this time, large numbers of men will be con-
 
81 See generally Antonia Abbey, Misperception as an Antecedent of Acquaintance Rape:  A 
Consequence of Ambiguity in Communication Between Women and Men (acknowledging, after 
an analysis of the data, that “token resistance perpetuates miscommunication between 
the sexes and encourages date rape”), in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE:  THE HIDDEN CRIME 96, 
104-06 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991). 
82 See, e.g., SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 100 (1987) (“Women as well as men have 
viewed male aggressiveness as desirable and forced sex as an expression of love.”); 
SCHULHOFER, supra note 31, at 63-64 (“[M]en are not the only ones who believe that 
‘no’ can mean yes.  Women sometimes share that vocabulary themselves.”). 
83 ESTRICH, supra note 82, at 102-03 (emphasis added). 
84 Id. at 101. 
85 Husak & Thomas, supra note 3, at 106. 
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victed of felonies for acting, reasonably and in good faith, on the basis 
of “generalizations that describe how persons actually behave.”86  In-
deed, the shocking spectacle of men losing their liberty for such beha-
vior is precisely the mechanism contemplated for jolting people into 
the realization that “their accustomed ways of doing things” are now 
illegal.87  In addition, once men “get the message” that they must pre-
sume “no” means “no” regardless of what they have reason to believe a 
woman intends, the sexual autonomy of women will also be con-
strained.  Those who follow the “no means yes” script to experience 
the thrill of feeling overcome by passion will be denied experiences 
they find pleasurable.88  Reconstructing norms by annihilating the li-
berty of nonculpable actors rather than through educating and per-
suading such persons to change their beliefs and desires, the conven-
tionalists conclude, “is manifestly unjust.”89 
Indeed, coerced norm reconstruction, they maintain, is likely to be 
futile.  “Commentators display both arrogance and naiveté in suppos-
ing that statutory change is likely to alter the way that persons relate to 
one another sexually.”90  At best, radical reform will be inert because of 
the disposition of decisionmakers to construe general statutory formu-
lations in a manner that fits the law to their expectations about what 
behavior means.91  Consider the fate of the post-Berkowitz reforms:  when 
authoritative commentators and jurists observed that the Pennsylvania 
legislature had authorized an offender to be punished for sexual assault 
and possibly even rape without proof of physical force, they inferred 
that defendants in date-rape cases—ones in which a woman says “no” to 
sexual intercourse but does not physically resist—should be permitted 




88 See Husak & Thomas, Date Rape, supra note 69, at 113-14 (“A proposal designed 
to make it more difficult for men to get away with rape might have the unanticipated 
effect of making it harder for some women to get what they want.”); Husak & Thomas, 
supra note 3, at 109 (arguing that rape law should “allow persons to express or withhold 
their consent to sex by whatever means they choose”). 
89 Husak & Thomas, Date Rape, supra note 69, at 126; see also Husak & Thomas, su-
pra note 3, at 106-07. 
90 Husak & Thomas, supra note 3, at 106. 
91 See Husak & Thomas, Date Rape, supra note 69, at 110-11 (noting that reform 
statutes can be read consistently with the convention that treats behavior as trumping 
a verbal “no”). 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 43-51; see also Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621, 
624-25 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that while “the legislature has substantially 
enhanced the risk of conviction in ambiguous circumstances by eliminating the re-
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At worst, laws that frontally assault those expectations—by treating 
sex when a woman says “no” as rape despite the absence of any force 
and despite the presence of nonverbal cues that conventionally signify 
consent—will backfire.  Police will refuse to arrest, prosecutors to 
charge, and juries to convict.  Their conspicuous resistance, moreover, 
will be seen as confirming that the new law reflects not genuine 
changes in public mores but only the illegitimate responsiveness of the 
law to special-interest advocacy groups.  That message will reinforce 
existing norms, including the “no means yes” script, in the mind of the 
public.93  The apparent inefficacy of reform efforts in the small num-
ber of states that have significantly departed from the common law de-
finition of rape94 has been attributed to such dynamics.95 
To mitigate the risk of backlash and the perceived unfairness of 
stigmatizing as “rapists” men who have internalized prevailing norms, 
some commentators have proposed creation of a separate, less severely 
punished offense for nonconsensual but nonforcible sexual inter-
course.96  This approach matches the outcome that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court achieved in Berkowitz when it affirmed the defendant’s 
conviction for the lesser offense of “indecent assault” and the com-
promise that the Pennsylvania legislature codified when it created the 
new offense of “sexual assault.”97  Treating nonconsensual but nonforc-
ible sex as a separate crime might be seen as an interim measure that 
would enable redefinition of rape law itself at a later time, after public 
expectations have adapted to the condemnatory message conveyed by 
the new crime.98 
 
quirement that the state prove ‘resistance,’” requiring proof of “recklessness” as to lack 
of consent “counteract[s] this risk”). 
93 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 31, at 104-05 (“[I]t seems plausible that a poor fit 
between legal terminology and ordinary language will tend to impede success in both 
directions of the legal-cultural dialogue. . . . The risk is nullification at all levels.  Prose-
cutors and jurors may misunderstand the new message (it’s not really force, not really 
rape).  Other citizens may not even hear it.”). 
94 See generally Jody Clay-Warner & Callie Harbin Burt, Rape Reporting After Reforms:  
Have Times Really Changed?, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 150 (2005) (documenting 
empirically the lack of effects from reform). 
95 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves:  Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 623 (2000) (“The failure of rape law reform fits the profile of a 
self-defeating ‘hard shove.’  There is genuine societal ambivalence about the ‘no means 
yes’ norm.”). 
96 See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 31, at 105. 
97 See supra text accompanying notes 24, 46. 
98 See Kahan, supra note 95, at 624. 
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But other norm reconstructionists forcefully reject this proposal.  
Calling coerced sex—whether or not accompanied by force—anything 
other than “rape,” they argue, “may obscure its unique indignity.”99  
And far from nudging norms in the direction of attitudes toward con-
demnation, treating such behavior as a lesser offense would entrench 
the understanding that merely treating “no” as a “yes” isn’t really 
rape.100  Indeed, the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s engrafting of a 
more liberal mistake defense onto sexual assault seems to confirm the 
inefficacy of the “lesser offense” gambit as a strategy of norm recon-
struction.101  Only “no means no” will work. 
II.  AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
Intertwined with the arguments of the standard critique, the con-
ventionalist defense, and the norm-reconstruction position is a series 
of disputed empirical claims.  Is there a convention for initiating con-
sensual sex that involves saying “no”?  Is it easily confused with what 
happened in Berkowitz?  Is there a conflict between men and women 
on whether “no” ever means “yes” or “maybe”?  Would reforming the 
common law definition of rape—by dispensing with the “force” ele-
ment, by imposing strict liability on consent, or by stipulating that in-
tercourse when someone says “no” is legally sufficient for conviction—
have any effect in cases like Berkowitz?  Might the effect be perverse—a 
resentful backlash against convicting in such cases?  If such reforms in-
crease the likelihood of conviction, will men who are acting consistent-
ly with “accustomed ways of doing things” be taken by surprise?102  
Would women welcome the resulting reconstruction of norms or in-
stead be aggrieved by it? 
Because those involved in the “no means . . . ?” debate do not nec-
essarily agree on ends—on what states of affairs the law should pursue 
or on how different interests should be weighed and conflicts between 
them resolved—answers to these questions will not dictate a particular 
resolution to it.  But they would clearly help to sharpen it by weeding 
out normative arguments that rest on misguided factual premises or 
that offer prescriptions unlikely to achieve their intended effect. 
 
99 ESTRICH, supra note 82, at 81. 
100 See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1183 (1986) (“[F]orced sex should be 
a crime even when there is no weapon or no beating. . . . [W]e should be ready to an-
nounce to society our condemnation of coerced and nonconsensual sex . . . .”). 
101 See supra text accompanying notes 46-51. 
102 Husak & Thomas, supra note 3, at 106. 
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In this Part, I will describe a study designed to generate insight in-
to some of the disputed empirical issues in the “no means . . . ?” de-
bate.  That study was a mock-juror experiment, in which individual 
subjects read a detailed vignette patterned on Berkowitz, after which 
they indicated their views of the key facts and the correct verdict. 
Such a study can be expected to deepen understanding of the 
“no means . . . ?” debate in three specific ways.  Most obviously, de-
spite the differences between it and an actual trial, a study of this 
form is highly predictive of how individual jurors are likely to decide 
a case like Berkowitz.103 
Less obviously but more importantly, such a study can illuminate 
the bases of political conflict over acquaintance-rape cases.  The vignette 
furnishes subjects with a picture comparable in completeness—or, 
more accurately, incompleteness—to the one that ordinary members 
of the public are exposed to when they learn about such a case from 
the media (not to mention the ones law students get when they read 
an opinion in a casebook).  To make sense of it, subjects are forced to 
draw on the same sensibilities and experiences that provoke such in-
tense and intensely polarized reactions to real-world acquaintance-
rape controversies. 
Finally, and most importantly, the study can be combined with 
other sources of empirical information to form a web of convergently 
validating results.  Indeed, as will be explained, the study’s hypotheses 
reflect a synthesis of insights from a variety of social science investiga-
tions of token resistance.  These materials suggest an account of the 
“no means . . . ?” debate very different from the ones that animate the 
standard critique, the conventionalist defense, or the norm-
 
103 Comparative evaluations of different testing formats suggest that mock jurors’ 
reactions to detailed trial vignettes is strongly predictive of how they respond to more 
vivid forms of proof, including the testimony of live witnesses.  See Brian H. Bornstein, 
The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations:  Is the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 
(1999).  In addition, the views of individual jurors after consideration of the evidence 
are generally thought to be highly predictive of how they’ll vote at the conclusion of 
deliberations, see Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, Rasmy Sey-
ing & Jennifer Pryce, Jury Decision Making:  45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating 
Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 690 (2001), although research suggests that it 
is generally easier for proacquittal factions to attain support through deliberations than 
it is for proconviction factions, see Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric In-
fluence in Mock Jury Deliberation:  Jurors’ Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 21 (1988).  See generally Nicole L. Waters & Valerie P. Hans, A Jury of One:  Opi-
nion Formation, Conformity, and Dissent on Juries, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 513, 537 
(2009) (reporting that a survey study of actual criminal jurors supports findings on de-
cisionmaking dynamics generated by mock-jury research but also suggests the impor-
tance of deliberations in overcoming dissenting views). 
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reconstructionist position.  The theory of cultural cognition is used to 
link this account to a set of predictions about who will see what and 
why in a case like Berkowitz. 
A.  Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
1. Cultural Cognition 
The cultural-cognition thesis posits that culture is prior to fact in 
law.104  Individuals’ group commitments determine not merely what 
significance they believe the law should attach to particular facts but 
also what they perceive to be legally significant facts.105  Did a woman 
who shot her sleeping husband honestly believe she faced an imme-
diate threat of death or great bodily harm?106  Did the driving of a man 
who led the police on a high-speed chase put the public at risk of 
death or serious injury?107  Does vaccination of schoolgirls against HPV 
promote promiscuous sex?108  Do laws permitting citizens to carry con-
cealed handguns increase violent crime or reduce it?109  The beliefs 
people form about these and other empirical issues vary in patterns 
that reflect and reinforce their cultural worldviews. 
Cultural cognition is a form of identity self-defense.110  It is unset-
tling to be confronted with the claim that behavior revered in one’s 
community is detrimental to society, or that behavior detested within 
one’s community is benign or even socially beneficial.  The costs of ac-
cepting such a claim can include emotional dissonance and alienation 
 
104 Kahan, Braman, Slovic & Gastil, supra note 6, at 1083. 
105 Id.; see also Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Monahan, Lisa Callahan & El-
len Peters, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy:  The Case of Outpatient Commitment Laws, 
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/ 
s10979-008-9174-4 (finding that individuals conform their notions of policy-relevant facts 
to their personal cultural views). 
106 See Kahan & Braman, supra note 8, at 21-22 (presenting a study of how people 
use their cultural perceptions to judge self-defense cases). 
107 See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 8, passim (using Scott v. Harris to in-
vestigate how perceptions of societal risk may differ with alternate visions of society). 
108 See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Geoffrey L. Cohen, John Gastil & Paul Slov-
ic, Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and Why?  An Experimental Study of the Mechan-
isms of Cultural Cognition, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. (forthcoming 2010), available at  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10979-009-9201-0. 
109 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion:  A Cultural 
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1299-1308 (2003) (confirming 
through testing that beliefs about gun control are derived from people’s cultural 
perceptions). 
110 Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 7, at 470. 
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from others whose support is essential to one’s material and psychic 
well-being.111  The consequences of others’ widespread acceptance of 
the claim can include restrictions on behavior necessary to attain re-
spect within one’s own community and a diminishment of status for 
one’s group in society at large.112  Individuals who share a cultural 
identity are thus predisposed to selectively credit evidence of such 
claims in a manner supportive of their prior beliefs.  For the same rea-
son, people who subscribe to competing cultural identities tend to dis-
agree about the validity of such evidence—creating visible forms of cul-
tural conflict that reinforce the impression of all that the status of 
their respective groups is at stake in policy decisions that turn on dis-
puted facts of this sort.113 
2.  The Cultural Logic of “Token Resistance” 
The reason to suspect that cultural cognition might be at work in 
the “no means . . . ?” debate is the link researchers have established be-
tween beliefs about communication of sexual interest and “attitudes 
[that] represent an aspect of people’s core identity.”114  The body of 
work on token resistance shows that the self-reported incidence of this 
behavior, as well as the distribution of perceptions related to it, corre-
lates with competing cultural styles.115 
Measured with a set of related attitudinal scales, these competing 
styles feature opposing gender norms.  One, which is conservative, 
traditional, and hierarchical in its orientation, prescribes highly diffe-
rentiated and stratified gender roles.  Men demonstrate their virtue 
through competition in civil society at large.  They are entitled to ex-
ercise authority over women, whose status depends on successfully dis-
 
111 See Cohen, supra note 7, at 821. 
112 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 7, at 470 (connecting this 
dynamic to white hierarchical and individualistic males’ skepticism of assertions that 
gun ownership and commercial activity—behaviors that are distinctively status enhanc-
ing for such individuals—pose societal risks); see also Cohen, supra note 7, at 821 (not-
ing that dissonance resulting from a disparity in personal belief and group belief may 
be dissipated by either changing one’s attitude to make it consistent with that of the 
group or reducing association with the particular group). 
113 See Kahan, supra note 10, at 126-30 (asserting that cultural cognition causes in-
dividuals to view “the State’s adoption of instrumental policies . . . as adjudicating the 
competence and virtue of those who adhere to competing cultural outlooks”). 
114 Martha R. Burt, Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE:  THE 
HIDDEN CRIME, supra note 81, at 26, 33. 
115 See, e.g., Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 70, at 878 (“[W]hat is impor-
tant is not the woman’s attitudes, but her perceptions of the attitudes held by the cul-
ture in general . . . .”). 
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charging domestic responsibilities.  Within this way of life, male prom-
iscuity is tolerated—if not admired—but women are expected to be 
both chaste and faithful; a woman who engages in sex outside of mar-
riage (or outside of a committed relationship likely to lead to mar-
riage) is viewed with suspicion and contempt.  The alternative style is 
more egalitarian in nature.  It judges the character of men and women 
by a largely unitary measure and treats female sexuality as a legitimate 
expression of individual autonomy.116 
Token resistance is a social script—a form of behavior recognized 
and performed because of its cultural meaning—that is distinctive of 
the hierarchical style.117  It is not, however, normative within that way of 
life.  On the contrary, it is conceived of as a behavioral strategy for 
evading the adverse consequences properly visited on those who defy 
hierarchical norms of female sexuality. 
A woman who subscribes to this style but desires to engage in disap-
proved-of sexual behavior faces a dilemma.  “She can either openly ac-
knowledge her desire for sex and face negative sanctions”—including, 
ironically, the likely contempt of the man with whom she is interested in 
having sex—or “she can refuse and be labeled ‘respectable.’”118 
Token resistance can furnish a means to mitigate this conflict.  By 
conforming to this script, a woman obtains the benefit of sex with a 
particular man while communicating that she does not have an appetite 
for casual or promiscuous sex generally.119  If successful, this signal will 
 
116 See Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 217, 222-23 (1980) (measuring the correlation between different atti-
tudes and the acceptance of rape myths); Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 70, 
at 874-76 (measuring the reasons that women engage in token resistance). 
117 See Burt, supra note 116, at 229 (finding that hierarchical and traditional atti-
tudes correlate with a belief that women feign resistance to sex); Karen S. Calhoun & 
Ruth M. Townsley, Attributions of Responsibility for Acquaintance Rape (describing research 
finding that such attitudes correlate with blaming the victim), in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE:  
THE HIDDEN CRIME, supra note 81, at 57, 63; Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 
70, at 872 (stating that the belief in token resistance “is based on the traditional sexual 
script in which women’s role is to act resistant to sex and men’s role is to persist in their 
sexual advances despite women’s resistance”); see also Linda Kalof, Rape-Supportive Atti-
tudes and Sexual Victimization Experiences of Sorority and Nonsorority Women, 29 SEX ROLES 
767, 773-74 (1993) (finding that acceptance of rape myths and interpersonal violence 
was more prevalent among college women who joined sororities than among those who 
did not join them).   
118 Muehlenhard & McCoy, supra note 70, at 449.  
119 See Michael W. Wiederman, The Gendered Nature of Sexual Scripts, 13 FAM. J. 
COUNSELING & THERAPY FOR COUPLES & FAMILIES 496, 499 (2005) (“The female’s task 
is to show enough sexual interest to communicate to the male that he is special to her, 
possibly warranting the risks that come with sex, but that she is not the type of female 
who engages in sexual activity indiscriminately.”). 
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be reassuring to a hierarchical man, whose virility is affirmed when a 
woman who has demonstrated (appropriate) reluctance to engage in 
sex generally is nonetheless unable to repress her desire to engage in 
sex with him.120  His committed behavior toward her thereafter can also 
help to counter the perception among others that the consent of the 
woman to sex shows that she is of bad character.  Accordingly, “token 
resistance may be a rational behavior for women in this culture” even if 
they find no intrinsic value in it or in fact resent it.121 
This account of token resistance fits women’s accounts of why they 
have engaged in it.  Although some women report other reasons for 
saying “no” when they intended to have sex—such as to avoid being 
taken for granted, particularly by a man with whom they have been in 
a longer-term relationship—the most commonly cited reasons are re-
putational:  “[I was in] [f]ear of [a]ppearing promiscuous”; “I didn’t 
want to appear too aggressive or eager”; “I didn’t want him to think I 
was easy or loose”; “I was afraid of his telling other people.”122 
The strategic character of token resistance is also strongly corrobo-
rated by the relationship of this behavior to women’s perceptions of the 
cultural style of their sexual partners.  If women engaged in token resis-
tance because they found it intrinsically valuable, we might expect them 
to say “no” when they mean “yes” regardless of the moral outlooks of 
their sexual partners.  But in fact research shows that women by and 
large tend to engage in token resistance only when they perceive the 
men with whom they are having sex subscribe to hierarchical gender 
norms.123  Women who believe that their sex partners subscribe to the 
egalitarian style, in contrast, report not engaging in verbal misdirection 
about their sexual desires.124  This pattern, too, suggests that women who 
conform to the token-resistance script do so mainly to avoid the adverse 
inference they believe others (the men they desire to have sex with and 
 
120 See id. at 498 (“The greater sexual reluctance in women’s sexual scripts makes 
achieving sexual activity with a new partner all the more rewarding for males.”). 
121 Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 70, at 878; see also Abbey, supra note 81, 
at 104 (discussing “the effects of gender-role stereotypes on women’s sexual behavior”); 
Robin Warshaw & Andrea Parrot, The Contribution of Sex-Role Socialization to Acquaintance 
Rape (describing how women have been socialized to engage in token resistance), in 
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE:  THE HIDDEN CRIME, supra note 81, at 73, 75-76. 
122 Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 70, at 875. 
123 See Muehlenhard & McCoy, supra note 70, at 457. 
124 Id. 
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the people with whom those men might communicate) will draw about 
their character if they appear too interested in sex.125 
Indeed, research on token resistance finds that women who report 
having engaged in it are themselves likely to be ambivalent toward the 
hierarchical style.  This, too, fits the cultural logic of “no means yes.”  
As one would expect, because they reject hierarchical norms without 
qualification, college-aged women who are highly egalitarian are very 
unlikely to report having said “no” when they meant “yes.”126  But the 
same is true of college-aged women who are the most hierarchical in 
their outlooks.  These women have little occasion to engage in token 
resistance because, consistent with their dedication to hierarchical 
sexual mores, they report not being sexually active at all.127  College-
aged women committed to hierarchy but only weakly are the ones with 
the greatest incentive to engage in token resistance, because they are 
the ones who are unhappy with its norms against casual sex but who 
have reason to worry about what the effect of defying those norms will 
be on their standing among their peers.128 
Whereas the correlation between a hierarchical cultural style and 
engaging in token resistance takes the form of an inverted “U,” the as-
sociation between a hierarchical style and perceptions that women en-
gage in this behavior is more linear.  Women who subscribe to the hie-
rarchical style are not only more likely than moderately or extremely 
egalitarian women to believe that women sometimes say “no” when they 
mean “yes” to sex.129  They are also much more likely to see behavior as-
sociated with indirect communication of sexual interest—such as hav-
ing a drink with a man, accompanying him to his apartment, or wear-
ing revealing clothing—as reason to discount explicit verbal protests.130  
The hierarchical style has been associated, too, with a disposition to 
blame women who engage in these forms of behavior for “leading men 
on” when those women assert that they have been raped.131 
In other words, women who are strongly committed to hierarchy 
not only strongly believe that some women engage in token resistance 
 
125 See id. at 449 (noting the “double bind” of women who desire sex but wish to 
avoid being labeled as “easy”). 
126 See Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 70, at 875 (finding that sexually ex-
perienced women who reported never having engaged in token resistance had the least 
traditional gender-role attitudes). 
127 Id. 
128 See id. at 876-78. 
129 Id. at 877. 
130 See Burt, supra note 116, at 229. 
131 See Calhoun & Townsley, supra note 117, at 63. 
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but are also very keen to detect and condemn it.  The cultural logic of 
token resistance explains why.  Women only weakly committed to hie-
rarchy are attempting to attain the recognition and esteem afforded to 
women who comply with that cultural style’s gender norms without ge-
nuinely adhering to its rules against gratification of casual sexual de-
sire.  From this point of view, the women who practice token resistance 
are resented for attempting to disguise their vicious characters so that 
they can wrongfully appropriate the status that should be afforded on-
ly to truly virtuous women. 
This interest in separating the posers from the genuinely virtuous 
women—as the hierarchical cultural worldview identifies them—
resonates with traditional explications of the “force or threat of force” 
element of rape.  In particular, it captures why the common law jurists 
equated “force” with physical resistance on the part of the woman: 
 While courts no longer require a female to resist to the utmost or to 
resist where resistance would be foolhardy, they do require her acquies-
cence in the act of intercourse to stem from fear generated by something 
of substance.  She may not simply say, “I was really scared,” and thereby 
transform consent or mere unwillingness into submission by force.  
These words do not transform a seducer into a rapist.  She must follow 
the natural instinct of every proud female to resist, by more than mere 
words, the violation of her person by a stranger or an unwelcomed 
friend.  She must make it plain that she regards such sexual acts as ab-
horrent and repugnant to her natural sense of pride.  She must resist un-
less the defendant has objectively manifested his intent to use physical 
force to accomplish his purpose.132 
On this logic, a woman must physically resist to convincingly show 
us—to make it “plain”—that she possesses the “natural sense of pride” 
that, in a virtuous woman, makes sex outside an appropriate relation-
ship truly “abhorrent and repugnant.”  “Mere words” (“no,” “stop”) 
are just that—mere words, a form of cheap talk that a bad woman can 
easily use to disguise her lack of virtue.  Men know that bad women 
strategically feign lack of consent for precisely this reason.  As a result, 
“[t]hese words do not transform a seducer”—no hero, to be sure, but 
one whose indulgence of his natural male appetite for casual sex is ex-
cusable—“into a rapist,” a man whose willingness to “violat[e]” a truly 
virtuous woman marks him out as unqualifiedly vicious.133 
 
132 State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 733 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J., dissenting). 
133 See generally Kathryn M. Ryan, Rape and Seduction Scripts, 12 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 
237 (1988) (presenting scripts of what college students perceived to be typical rape and 
seduction scenarios, and noting that while dating scripts can “include manipulation, ex-
ploitation, and power,” they generally lack the violence distinctive of rape scripts). 
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3.  Hypotheses 
Because token resistance is associated with contested cultural 
norms, the cultural-cognition thesis implies that individuals who hold 
opposing cultural outlooks will form different perceptions of the facts 
in a date-rape case like Berkowitz.  As a result of varying experiences 
and forms of socialization, individuals of diverse cultural persuasions 
will have competing understandings of the conventions by which 
people communicate consent to sex.  Even more importantly, as a re-
sult of varying emotional and social commitments, individuals of di-
verse cultural persuasions will acquire uneven identity stakes in the 
law’s recognition (or rejection) of the norms that construct the cultur-
al logic of token resistance.  Individuals whose group status is bound 
up with their mastery of those norms will be psychologically motivated 
to construe legally consequential facts in a way that affirms these 
norms.  Individuals whose status depends on opposing norms, in con-
trast, will be motivated to see the facts in exactly the opposite way, in 
part to protect the relative standing of their cultural community in so-
ciety at large, and in part to protect their own personal standing within 
that group.  We should thus expect date-rape cases to feature the same 
sort of cultural polarization over facts that characterizes issues like gun 
control and even climate change.134 
This account suggests four concrete hypotheses: 
First, the law will not matter very much in a case like Berkowitz.  The 
cultural-cognition thesis holds that individuals form perceptions of 
fact that reaffirm their cultural values.  Such affirmation occurs when 
the law takes a position the social meaning of which credits their 
norms over competing ones.  Accordingly, if the legal doctrine appli-
cable to a class of cases changes, individuals’ factual perceptions are 
also likely to change in whatever way is necessary to assure a meaning-
favorable outcome.135  Thus, individuals’ willingness to convict a man 
of rape in a case in which a woman said “no” should not depend on 
whether the individuals apply the common law or one or another 
reform definition of rape, including one aimed specifically at making 
the law less accommodating of the belief that “no” sometimes means 
“yes.”  Confirmation of this hypothesis would help explain why the 
 
134 See Kahan, supra note 10, at 125-42 (describing cultural polarization surround-
ing numerous policy-related facts on these and other issues). 
135 See generally Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom:  Lay Representations of Legal 
Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 868-69 (1991) (analyzing mock-juror 
experiments showing that lay perceptions of common crimes trumped legal definitions 
in jurors’ decisionmaking). 
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adoption of such reforms appears to have had little or no effect on the 
incidence of rape.136 
Second, culture will matter a lot.  Cultural commitments furnish the 
norms that shape individuals’ interpretations of others’ sexual inten-
tions and that psychologically motivate their perception of facts.  Rela-
tive to the law and other influences, then, individuals’ cultural identi-
ties should play a large role in explaining their disagreements about 
what happened in a case like Berkowitz and what the verdict should be. 
Third, hierarchs and egalitarians will disagree.  Again, studies suggest 
that the logic of token resistance is constructed by norms associated 
with a hierarchical style that emphasizes traditional gender roles.  An 
outcome that recognizes the validity of the behavioral generalizations 
reflected in the token-resistance script and, more importantly, that ex-
presses an appropriate judgment of condemnation for this perceived 
form of strategic norm-evasion is thus affirming of a hierarchical 
worldview.  Individuals who have a hierarchical identity, then, can be 
expected to form the most pro-defendant fact perceptions and out-
come judgments in a case like Berkowitz.  By the same token, individu-
als who have egalitarian identities should be expected to form the 
most anti-defendant fact perceptions and outcome judgments.  A ver-
dict of guilty for rape (however the law defines it) is the outcome that 
most clearly expresses affirmation of egalitarian norms by visiting con-
demnation on a defendant whose behavior—taking “no” as “yes”—
symbolizes hostility to female sexual autonomy. 
The framework associated with the cultural-cognition thesis cha-
racterizes individuals’ worldviews not only as either hierarchical or 
egalitarian but also as individualistic or communitarian.  Individualis-
tic norms tend to confer status on both men and women for mastery of 
market and professional roles.137  But because communitarian norms 
reward men and women alike for resistance to acquisitive or self-
seeking behavior, the individualist/communitarian dimension of cul-
tural worldview does not oppose gender roles per se as strongly as the 
hierarchical/egalitarian dimension does.  Accordingly, differences 
 
136 See Carol Bohmer, Acquaintance Rape and the Law (discussing studies demonstrat-
ing little change in the rate of rape complaints, arrests, and convictions despite re-
formed rape laws), in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE:  THE HIDDEN CRIME, supra note 81, at 317, 
326; Clay-Warner & Burt, supra note 94. 
137 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 7, at 493 (reporting the 
results of a study confirming that individualistic orientation led to similar effects “with-
out regard to gender” for certain forms of risk associated with gender-specific roles 
within a hierarchical way of life). 
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along the former dimension cannot confidently be expected to ex-
plain a significant portion of the variance in views about how a case 
like Berkowitz should be decided. 
Fourth, other individual characteristics will influence variance in a man-
ner consistent with their relationship to cultural identities.  People tend to 
define their cultural identities not only with reference to their prefe-
rences for how social relations should be organized but also with ref-
erence to membership in various sorts of groups that tend to be asso-
ciated with worldviews of that type.  Hierarchs, for example, tend to be 
politically conservative and are more likely to reside in the South; ega-
litarians are more likely to be liberal and live in the Northeast.  Mem-
bership in these sorts of groups, then, can reasonably be expected to 
explain some variance in fact perceptions and outcome judgments in a 
case like Berkowitz, possibly even after cultural values themselves are 
controlled for. 
Gender, on its own, should not be expected to be an important 
predictor of individuals’ fact perceptions and outcome judgments.  
Culture divides women as well as men.  As a result, women who sub-
scribe to a hierarchical cultural worldview should, on this account, be 
disposed toward acquittal, at least relative to egalitarian men, who 
should be disposed toward conviction.  Indeed, the cultural-
cognition thesis furnishes reason to expect that hierarchical women 
might be even stronger in their pro-defendant perceptions and 
judgments than hierarchical men.  As they see it, at least, hierarchic-
al women are the ones whose status is being misappropriated by the 
women who use token resistance to try to disguise their imperfect 
commitment to the norms that entitle women to respect within the 
hierarchical worldview.  They are the ones, then, who have the great-
est cultural identity stake in aligning the expressive force of law to-
ward condemnation of such behavior. 
Thus, if gender does impact perceptions and outcome judgments 
in a case like Berkowitz, it should do so in conjunction with culture by 
making hierarchical women the individuals most disposed to believe 
that “no” meant “yes.”  This hypothesis fits awkwardly with both the 
standard feminist critique of the common law definition of rape and 
the conventionalist defense of it.138  But it is consistent with the intui-
 
138 It is neither at odds with nor supported, however, by past mock-jury studies.  
Such studies frequently find that women form judgments comparable to those of men 
in cases in which facts such as consent are in dispute.  See, e.g., Louise Ellison & Vanessa 
E. Munro, Reacting to Rape:  Exploring Mock Jurors’ Assessments of Complainant Credibility, 49 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 202, 206 (2009) (reporting that female subjects in British mock-
15 KAHAN FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2010  6:10 PM 
764 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 729 
tion of experienced criminal defense lawyers that certain types of 
middle-aged women will be their very best jurors in a date-rape case.139 
 
juror experiments “[o]ften . . . took a prominent role, asserting that had they been in 
the complainant’s position they would have resisted more forcefully”); Michaela Hynie, 
Regina A. Schuller & Lisa Couperthwaite, Perceptions of Sexual Intent:  The Impact of Con-
dom Possession, 27 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 75, 78 (2003) (presenting results of a Canadian 
study in which both female and male subjects were more likely to perceive consent 
when the woman who said “no” possessed condoms).   
 One study (using American subjects) found that being female predicted a greater 
likelihood of supporting acquittal in rape cases in which consent is disputed.  See John 
Stuart Batchelder, Douglas D. Koski & Ferris R. Byxbe, Women’s Hostility Toward Women 
in Rape Trials:  Testing the Intra-Female Gender Hostility Thesis, 28 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 181 
(2004).  This study, however, used a nonrepresentative sample of subjects (over half of 
whom were working or had previously worked in law enforcement) who volunteered to 
participate.  See id. at 188, 190.  More importantly, the study furnished no insight into 
the source of gender differences.  In fact, male and female subjects in the study were 
equally likely to support conviction, see id. at 190; gender was a significant predictor 
(the effect size of which is not reported in practically meaningful terms) only after con-
trolling for prior jury service, past criminal victimization, past service as a law-
enforcement officer, and membership in a crime-prevention group.  No data were col-
lected (or at least reported) on cultural attitudes, political ideology, or other demo-
graphic variables that might have shed light on differences among women (or simply 
wiped out any gender effect among subjects generally).  The basic hypothesis of the 
study—that women would seek to minimize their own sense of vulnerability by dis-
counting the credibility of female sexual-assault victims, or by otherwise attributing 
blameworthy behavior to the victim—presumably would not predict that hierarchical 
women are more likely than egalitarian ones to form proacquittal sensibilities, as is 
predicted by cultural cognition.   
 One mock-juror study that did use attitudinal variables measuring adherence to 
“rape myths” (e.g., “[a] woman who goes to the home or apartment of a man on their 
first date implies that she is willing to have sex”) found that such measures did signifi-
cantly predict acquittal in cases in which consent was disputed.  See Martha R. Burt & 
Rochelle Semmel Albin, Rape Myths, Rape Definitions, and Probability of Conviction, 11 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 212, 216-18, 217 tbl.1, 225 (1981).  That study did not find a 
significant relationship between gender and either adherence to such attitudes or wil-
lingness to convict.  See id. at 223 tbl.3.  The study did not investigate, however, whether 
individual differences in adherence to such attitudes had a larger impact on women 
than men.  In a previous study, one of the same researchers had found that a hierar-
chical attitude is associated with acceptance of rape myths.  See Burt, supra note 116.  To 
the extent that cultural cognition predicts that hierarchical women will be distinctly 
inclined to support acquittal in acquaintance-rape cases, it implies either that hierar-
chical women are more likely to subscribe to rape myths or that hierarchical women 
are influenced more strongly by adherence to rape myths to support acquittal than are 
other individuals. 
139 See, e.g., THOMAS THOMPSON, BLOOD AND MONEY 227 (1976) (referencing fam-
ous defense lawyer Richard “Racehorse” Haynes’s preference for female jurors in rape 
cases); Bryan Robinson, Finding the “Ideal” Michael Jackson Trial Juror, ABC NEWS, Jan. 31, 
2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/LegalCenter/story?id=438095 (report-
ing jury-selection expert Neil Vidmar’s statement that “some of the harshest critics of 
victims in [rape] cases have been shown to be women in their 50s”). 
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B.  Design and Methods 
A study was designed to test these hypotheses.  In the nature of a 
mock-jury experiment, the study analyzed subjects’ perceptions of the 
facts and their outcome judgments in a date-rape case patterned on 
Berkowitz. 
1.  Sample 
The study used a diverse, national sample of 1500 Americans aged 
eighteen years or older.  The sample was assembled by Polimetrix, a 
leading online public-opinion firm, and the study was conducted using 
Polimetrix’s Internet testing facilities.140  A demographic-matching me-
thodology assured that the sample was representative of the general 
American population.  The sample was 52% female, 74% white, and 
11% African-American.  The average income level was between $40,000 
and $40,999, and the average education level was “some college.”  The 
average age of the study subjects was forty-six.  Subjects were tested be-
tween March 31, 2009, and April 8, 2009. 
2.  Vignette 
Study subjects were advised that they would be assigned to “eva-
luate the evidence presented in a criminal rape trial” based on a 
“summary of the evidence . . . taken from a court opinion.”141  They 
then read a sixteen-paragraph vignette that consisted of a lightly 
edited version of the statement of the facts in Berkowitz as summarized 
by the intermediate appellate court,142 which furnished a more de-
tailed account of the trial testimony than did the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court.  The vignette presented the respective accounts of the 
defendant and the complainant (identified fictitiously as “Dave” and 
“Lucy”), who were described as agreeing that the complainant had re-
peatedly said “no” both before and during sexual intercourse. 
 
140 Polimetrix conducts online surveys and experiments on behalf of academic and 
governmental researchers and commercial customers (including political campaigns).  
It maintains a panel of over one million Americans to construct representative study 
samples.  For more information, including a description of the sampling methodology, 
see DOUGLAS RIVERS, SAMPLE MATCHING (n.d.), http://www.polimetrix.com/ 
company/whitepapers.html (follow “Sample Matching:  Representative Sampling from 
the Internet Panels” hyperlink). 
141 The study instrument is reproduced in the Appendix. 
142 See supra text accompanying notes 13-17. 
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Berkowitz was selected as the basis for the study vignette for several 
related reasons.  One was the nexus between the case and contested 
aspects of rape law in scholarly commentary.143  Another was the power 
of the case to provoke conflicting reactions, as demonstrated by the 
controversy the case occasioned when it was decided in 1994144 and by 
the lively debate it continues to generate in law school classrooms. 
Still another consideration was the presence of a variety of ambi-
guous facts in addition to the complainant’s verbal protestations.  For 
example, the parties had admittedly engaged in one or more conversa-
tions that could be understood as involving explicit sexual banter.  Did 
this fact imply that the complainant was trying to communicate an in-
terest in sex with the defendant?  Or did her willingness to engage in 
bawdy conversation make it seem less plausible to believe (or accept 
that the defendant would believe) that she was someone who would 
feel constrained to engage in deliberate misdirection about her desire 
to have sex in order to avoid appearing unduly interested?  The com-
plainant had also consumed a strong alcoholic drink immediately be-
fore the alleged rape.  Did this fact make it easier to believe that she 
was in a disinhibited state (possibly of her own design) and thus more 
open to consensual sex?145  Or did it suggest that she might have been 
in a vulnerable condition that the defendant was likely to recognize 
and exploit by forcing sex on her?  The complainant mentioned in her 
conversation with the defendant immediately before his sexual ad-
vances that she was trying to work out problems with her boyfriend.  
Did she do so to put the defendant on notice that she would not be re-
ceptive to a sexual overture, or instead to convey that she might be in-
terested despite her existing relationship?  Even if she did not tell the 
defendant about the problems with her boyfriend in order to invite his 
sexual overtures, might protecting her relationship with her boyfriend 
have given her a reason to lie to others about whether she consented—
or even to deceive herself as to whether she had consented? 
 
143 See, e.g., MCGREGOR, supra note 63, at 2 (citing Berkowitz as a contemporary ex-
ample of outmoded physical-resistance requirements); SCHULHOFER, supra note 31, at 
70-72 (using Berkowitz to illustrate difficulties with “force” requirements).   
144 See supra text accompanying notes 37-43. 
145 See Abbey, supra note 81, at 102 (describing studies identifying a woman’s con-
sumption of alcohol as a “cue that signals a woman’s sexual availability”); see also Debo-
rah R. Richardson & Georgina S. Hammock, Alcohol and Acquaintance Rape (reporting 
that study subjects judged a woman complaining of rape more negatively and as more 
blameworthy if she had consumed alcohol), in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE:  THE HIDDEN 
CRIME, supra note 81, at 83, 89. 
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One of the strangest facts in the case was the role of the complai-
nant’s attendance at a college-sponsored lecture entitled, “Does ‘No’ 
Sometimes Mean ‘Yes’?”  This fact, too, admits of competing infe-
rences.  Presumably the answer offered by the lecturer was “no”—“no” 
always means “no” to sex; events with this title were part of the effort of 
women’s rights advocates to raise awareness of date rape and to com-
bat the beliefs and attitudes thought to be contributing to it.146  Accor-
dingly, one could infer that the defendant, having been advised that 
the complainant had attended a lecture emphasizing this point, could 
not plausibly have understood the complainant to have meant “yes” 
when she said “no.”  Alternatively, the very need for the event unders-
cored that there is—or is at least thought to be—a convention in 
which a woman interested in sex feigns resistance.  Thus, one might 
see this fact as a reminder that the complainant might well have meant 
“yes” when she said “no.”  Indeed, for persons predisposed to react 
negatively to the perceived ideological motivations of those pressing 
for responses to date rape, the very existence of such a lecture might 
evoke resentment or skepticism inclining them toward a pro-
defendant view of the facts.  By the same token, persons committed, 
ideologically or otherwise, to opposing date rape would be cued by this 
fact to attend to facts supportive of identifying the coercive behavior 
characteristic of it.  Because the ambiguous significance of the com-
plainant’s attendance at the lecture could be expected to evoke exactly 
this tangle of conflicting reactions—and because a decision to alter a 
material fact of the case would itself have presented difficulties—this 
feature of the case was retained in the vignette. 
3.  Experimental Conditions:  Alternative Legal Standards 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of five conditions or 
groups.  Those in one—the no-definition condition—were not furnished 
with any definition of rape before responding to items relating to the 
facts and case outcome. 
In each of the other four conditions, subjects were supplied with a 
distinct definition of the crime before responding to those items.  
 
146 See Andrea Parrot, Institutional Response:  How Can Acquaintance Rape Be Pre-
vented? (“For maximum attendance, the loaded terms ‘date rape,’ ‘sexual harassment,’ 
‘acquaintance rape,’ or ‘sexual assault’ should not appear in the program title, because 
the students who are at risk for acquaintance rape involvement will probably not think 
these issues pertain to them.  Good title choices would be interesting yet related, such 
as:  ‘Does No Ever Mean Yes?’. . . .”), in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE:  THE HIDDEN CRIME, su-
pra note 81, at 355, 361. 
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Members of the common law condition were advised that “[a] man is 
guilty of rape if he (a) uses force or the threat of force (b) to engage 
in sexual intercourse with a woman (c) without the woman’s consent 
and (d) knows or can reasonably be expected to know the woman does 
not consent.”147 
Members of the strict-liability condition were advised that “[a] man is 
guilty of rape if he (a) uses force or the threat of force (b) to engage 
in sexual intercourse with a woman (c) without the woman’s consent.”  
They were also instructed explicitly that “a mistaken belief that the 
woman consented is not a defense.” 
Members of the reform condition were advised simply that “[a] man 
is guilty of rape if he (a) engages in sexual intercourse with a woman 
(b) without the woman’s consent.”  They, too, were advised that “a 
mistaken belief that the woman consented is not a defense.”  In addi-
tion, “consent” was expressly defined:  “‘[C]onsent’ means words or 
overt actions indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual inter-
course.”  This definition tracks the language of a reform definition 
adopted by Wisconsin148 and is similar to one adopted by Washington 
State.149  It is intended to eliminate accommodation of the belief that 
“no sometimes means yes” both by dispensing with the force require-
ment and by defining consent objectively—as “words or overt actions 
indicating a freely given agreement”—as opposed to a subjective mental 
state that one might infer to exist despite the complainant’s verbal 
manifestations of nonconsent. 
Whereas in Pennsylvania nonforcible, nonconsensual sex is desig-
nated as “sexual assault” for the express purpose of distinguishing it from 
the crime of “rape,” in Wisconsin both nonforcible, nonconsensual sex 
and forcible, nonconsensual sex are designated as forms of “sexual as-
sault,” presumably to avoid the inference that the former is different in 
 
147 “Sexual intercourse” was defined in the common law condition (and in the oth-
er three conditions specifying an express definition of rape) as “the penetration of a 
woman’s vagina by a man’s penis.” 
148 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(3) (West 2005) (“Whoever has sexual intercourse 
with a person without the consent of that person is guilty of a Class G felony.”); 
§ 940.225(4) (“‘Consent,’ as used in this section, means words or overt actions by a per-
son who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to 
have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”). 
149 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060(1) (2009) (“A person is guilty of rape in 
the third degree . . . [w]here the victim did not consent . . . to sexual intercourse with 
the perpetrator and such lack of consent was clearly expressed by the victim’s words or 
conduct . . . .”); § 9A.44.010(7) (“‘Consent’ means that at the time of the act of sexual 
intercourse . . . there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to 
have sexual intercourse . . . .”). 
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kind, as opposed to degree, from the latter.150  In Washington, nonforci-
ble, nonconsensual sex is designated as a lesser degree of “rape.”151 
For this study, nonforcible, nonconsensual sex was designated as 
“rape” and was not identified as a less aggravated alternative to a forci-
ble, nonconsensual version of the crime.  The point of this feature of 
the design was to enable testing of the conventionalist claim (shared 
by some norm reconstructionists) that a definition of rape that assimi-
lates nonforcible, nonconsensual sex to forcible nonconsensual sex 
can be expected to provoke resistance from decisionmakers. 
Finally, members of the no-means-no condition were also advised that 
“[a] man is guilty of rape if he (a) engages in sexual intercourse with a 
woman (b) without the woman’s consent.”  In this condition, however, 
subjects were also instructed that “sexual intercourse is ‘without the 
woman’s consent’ if the woman communicates by actions or by words, 
including the uttering of the word ‘no,’ that she does not consent to 
sexual intercourse.”  In addition, they were advised that “if [the man] 
knows that the woman has said ‘no,’ a mistaken belief that the woman 
consented is not a defense.”  A standard akin to this has been advo-
cated by some critics of the common law definition,152 but no state has 
adopted statutory language this definitive on the significance afforded 
to the word “no.” 
4.  Measures 
a.  Cultural Worldviews 
As in previous studies of cultural cognition,153 individuals’ cultural 
values were measured with “agree/disagree” attitudinal items forming 
two scales:  Hierarchy/Egalitarianism (Hierarchy) and Individual-
 
150 See Estrich, supra note 100, at 1183 (describing how categorizing violent rape as 
a different type of offense than nonforcible, nonconsensual sex might be considered 
distinguishing a “crime of violence” from “something else”). 
151 Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.040 (defining first-degree rape as forci-
ble, nonconsensual sex), and § 9A.44.050 (defining second-degree rape as forcible, 
nonconsensual sex without the aggravating factors of first-degree rape), with 
§ 9A.44.060 (defining third-degree rape as nonforcible, nonconsensual sex). 
152 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 82, at 100 (arguing that even an honest mistake as 
to consent is still unreasonable). 
153 See, e.g., Kahan, Braman, Monahan, Callahan & Peters, supra note 105 (testing 
hypotheses about how worldviews affect attitudes toward outpatient-commitment  
laws and generally explaining the Hierarchy/Egalitarianism and Individualism/ 
Communitarianism scales); Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Paul Slovic, John Gastil & 
Geoffrey Cohen, Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology, 4 NATURE 
NANOTECHNOLOGY 87, 87 (2009); Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 8, at 849-60. 
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ism/Communitarianism (Individualism).  The former measures how 
favorably or unfavorably disposed individuals are toward a social order 
that features differentiation and stratification of social roles based on 
observable and largely fixed characteristics (including race, gender, 
sexual orientation, and class).  The latter measures how favorably or 
unfavorably disposed individuals are toward a social order that treats 
individuals as responsible for securing the conditions of their own 
flourishing without collective assistance and that resists collective in-
terference with individual strivings.  Scale reliability was high (Hie-
rarchy,  = 0.89; Individualism,  = 0.91).154 
Hierarchy is comparable but not identical to the attitudinal meas-
ures used to characterize subjects’ gender-norm attitudes in studies of 
token resistance.  Like those measures, Hierarchy includes items that re-
late to traditional gender roles and sexual equality (e.g., “[s]ociety as a 
whole has become too soft and feminine”; “[p]arents should encourage 
young boys to be more sensitive and less rough and tough”155).  Howev-
er, it also includes items that relate to other dimensions of social stratifi-
cation unrelated to the gender-norm measures used in those studies 
(e.g., “[i]t seems like the criminals and welfare cheats get all the breaks, 
while the average citizen picks up the tab”156). 
Because the reliability of Hierarchy as a latent attitudinal measure 
indicates a high degree of affinity between hierarchical gender attitudes 
and hierarchical attitudes generally, there is no conceptual difficulty in 
using Hierarchy to test hypotheses related to the former.  Indeed, posi-
tive results obtained by the use of Hierarchy are arguably stronger than 
ones based on gender-role attitudinal scales.  Hierarchy measures a dis-
position more general than those measured by gender-role scales and is 
conceptually more remote from the study’s dependent variables, which 
themselves relate to perceptions of sexual behavior.157 
 
154 Cronbach’s alpha () is a statistic for measuring the internal validity of attitu-
dinal scales.  In effect, it measures the degree of intercorrelation among various items 
within a scale; a high score suggests that the items can be treated as a valid measure of a 
latent attitude or trait that cannot be directly observed and measured.  Generally,   
0.70 suggests scale validity.  See generally Jose M. Cortina, What Is Coefficient Alpha?  An 
Examination of Theory and Applications, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 98, 103-04 (1993) (de-
scribing the meaning and proper interpretation of coefficient alpha). 
155 Kahan, Braman, Monahan, Callahan & Peters, supra note 105, app. B. 
156 Id. 
157 See generally Paul Slovic & Ellen Peters, The Importance of Worldviews in Risk Per-
ception, 3 RISK DECISION & POL’Y 165, 168-69 (1998) (asserting that the influence of 
distal variables is ordinarily smaller but more important than the influence of prox-
imal variables). 
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b.  Other Individual Characteristics 
Data relating to the individual characteristics of the subjects were 
also collected.  These included conventional socio-demographic cha-
racteristics, such as gender, race, age, religious affiliation, household 
income, education, community type of residence (urban or non-
urban), and region of residence.  They also included liberal/ 
conservative ideology and political party affiliation. 
c.  Response Measures 
After reading the vignette and the legal definition (if any) corres-
ponding to their experimental condition, subjects indicated the inten-
sity of their agreement or disagreement with a series of statements.  
Most statements asserted propositions of fact:  “Despite what she said 
or might have felt after, Lucy really did consent to sexual intercourse 
with Dave” (CONSENT); “Lucy would have tried to push Dave off of 
her if she had really meant not to consent to sexual intercourse” 
(NORESIST); “Dave believed that Lucy consented to sexual inter-
course” (HONEST); “Given all the circumstances, it would have been 
reasonable for Dave to believe Lucy consented to sexual intercourse” 
(REASONABLE); “By saying ‘no’ several times, Lucy made it clear to 
Dave that she did not consent to sexual intercourse” (NOMEANSNO).  
An additional item related to the fairness of a rape conviction in the 
case:  “It would be unfair to convict Dave of a crime as serious as rape” 
(UNFAIR).  The final item related to the outcome:  “Dave should be 
found guilty of rape” (GUILTY). 
5.  Statistical Analyses 
It was anticipated that the results would be analyzed in two steps.  
Preliminary analyses would consist of the computation of simple re-
sponse frequencies and means across groups of interest.  Thereafter, 
multivariate analyses, including ordered logistical regression and sta-
tistical simulation,158 would be used to test hypotheses relating to the 
effect of legal definitions, cultural identities, and other influences. 
 
158 See ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND 
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 137-66 (2007) (explaining how to use statistical 
inferences and probability models as well as how to check statistical procedures and 
model fits); Gary King, Michael Tomz & Jason Wittenberg, Making the Most of Statistical 
Analyses:  Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 347, 349-54 (2000) 
(recommending and explaining an approach based on statistical simulation). 
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Statistical simulations add substantial value to nonlinear multiva-
riate regression.  One of the benefits is clarity.  The practical upshot of 
the conventional elements of a regression output—including regres-
sion coefficients (whether or not standardized), one or another meas-
ure of error (such as standard errors or t -statistics), and notations of 
the presence of specified levels of statistical significance—defy 
straightforward interpretation, even by those who know what they sig-
nify.  Through the use of simulations, in contrast, a researcher can de-
rive very precise, universally comprehensible, and practically meaning-
ful estimates of how particular explanatory variables (say, gender, 
education level, and cultural worldview) influence a quantity of inter-
est (say, the likelihood that a person will take one position or another 
on a contested issue of fact at trial).159  Such estimates, moreover, often 
lend themselves to graphic presentation that conveys relevant informa-
tion much more readily than regression-output tables do.160 
In addition, simulation permits a researcher to extract a greater 
quantity of information from a regression analysis.161  Normally, evalua-
tion of regression outputs consists simply of noting the presence and 
sign of statistically significant coefficients.  In simulations, variables 
that fall short of a specified level of statistical significance can (and 
should) be included in a researcher’s estimates.162  Often it will be 
worthwhile to generate estimates based only on variance in nonsignifi-
cant variables so that readers can make their own assessments of the 
practical relevance of influences whose confidence intervals suggest 
that their effect is highly likely to be different from zero—not to men-
 
159 See King, Tomz & Wittenberg, supra note 158, at 347 (describing how statistical 
simulations based on multivariate regression “(1) convey numerically precise estimates of 
the quantities of greatest substantive interest, (2) include reasonable measures of uncer-
tainty about those estimates, and (3) require little specialized knowledge to understand”). 
160 See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective 
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies (pt. 1), 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1827-34 
(2006) (describing how statistical regressions often do not convey as much substance as 
a graphical depiction of estimates does); Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Christina L. 
Boyd, On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies (pt. 2), 60 VAND. L. 
REV. 801, 841-42 (2007) (describing the benefits of graphs over regression estimates); 
Andrew Gelman, Cristian Pasarica & Rahul Dodhia, Let’s Practice What We Preach:  Turn-
ing Tables into Graphs, 56 AM. STATISTICIAN 121, 121 (2002) (asserting that graphs are 
superior to tables for making comparisons). 
161 See King, Tomz & Wittenberg, supra note 158, at 347. 
162 See generally Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg & Gary King, Clarify:  Software for 
Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results, J. STAT. SOFTWARE, Jan. 5, 2003, at 1, 19, 
http://www.jstatsoft.org/v08/i01/paper (stating that inclusion of nonsignificant pre-
dictors in simulation “is not problematic because the true quantities of interest are 
usually the predicted values, . . . not the coefficients themselves”). 
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tion different at the specified level of significance from some pertinent 
value other than zero.163  Simulations can also be used to show that va-
riables the effects of which are nonsignificant on their own are statisti-
cally (and practically) significant when aggregated in combinations 
that are relevant to research hypotheses.164 
The size of the sample furnished adequate power to detect even 
small effect sizes (e.g., r = 0.10) with a probability well over 0.80 at p  
0.05.165  This degree of power minimized the risk of Type II error in 
the testing of hypotheses that involved the absence of a statistically 
significant and practically meaningful effect.166 
To facilitate multivariate analyses, missing data were replaced (for 
the multivariate analyses only) by multiple imputation.167  Five imputed 
data sets were used, more than ample for the observed rate of missing 
data (< 2%).168 
C.  Results 
Response measures consisted of three types:  one item relating to 
outcome judgments; eleven items relating to fact perceptions; and one item 
relating to the perceived fairness of conviction.  Preliminary analyses—
 
163 See id. (explaining that because “even coefficients that are not statistically signif-
icant can provide important information[—]after all, a coefficient that is not signifi-
cantly different from zero will probably [be] significantly different from almost all oth-
er numbers”—it is more sensible “to focus on the confidence intervals [the simulation] 
reports for each quantity it computes than the standard errors of coefficients”). 
164 See GELMAN & HILL, supra note 158, at 42, 69, 141-42 (identifying standards for 
use of combinations of predictors in nonlinear predictive models and advocating use of 
simulation for testing their effects); Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 8, at 871. 
165 See JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
36 tbl.2.3.5, 92 tbl.3.3.5 (2d ed. 1988) (displaying power-value tests run after the expe-
riment is performed). 
166 See generally David L. Streiner, Unicorns Do Exist:  A Tutorial on “Proving” the Null 
Hypothesis, 48 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 756, 759 (2003) (noting that more power is needed to 
avoid a Type II error when there are small or no differences between the two things 
being tested). 
167 See generally Gary King, James Honaker, Anne Joseph & Kenneth Scheve, Analyz-
ing Incomplete Political Science Data:  An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation, 95 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 49, 52-54 (2001) (introducing multiple imputation as an algorithm for 
analyzing political science data when there are missing values); Roderick J.A. Little & 
Donald B. Rubin, The Analysis of Social Science Data with Missing Values, 18 SOC. ME-
THODS & RES. 292, 303-06 (1989) (describing multiple imputation as a method for ana-
lyzing social science data sets when some data are missing). 
168 See Paul T. von Hippel, How Many Imputations Are Needed?  A Comment on Hersh-
berger and Fisher (2003), 12 STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING 334, 334 (2005) (con-
cluding that two to ten imputed data sets “suffice under most realistic circumstances”). 
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simple frequencies and means—and multivariate analyses are reported 
for each type separately. 
1.  Outcome Judgments 
a.  Preliminary Analyses 
Outcome judgments were highly varied, as shown in Figure 1.  Ag-
gregation of responses across the conditions shows that 57% of the sub-
jects agreed and 43% disagreed at some level of intensity with GUILTY 
(“Dave should be found guilty of rape”).  Moreover, over one-third of the 
subjects (34%) indicated that they leaned one way or the other only 
“slightly,” as opposed to “moderately” (27%) or “strongly” (39%). 
 
Figure 1:  Across-Condition Responses to GUILTY 
 
“Dave should be found guilty of rape.” 
 
Agree:  57% 




Note:  N = 1497.  Slices indicate percentage of subjects who gave indicated re-
sponse to GUILTY, all experimental conditions combined. 
 
As Figure 2 shows, disagreement was also pronounced within each 
of the experimental conditions.  Fifty-three percent of the subjects in 
the common law condition agreed at some level that Dave should be 
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found guilty; the proportion was the same in the no-definition condi-
tion.  In the strict-liability condition, 55% agreed, and in the reform 
condition, 62% did.  The proportion agreeing with GUILTY climbed 
to 65% in the “no means no” condition. 
 
Figure 2:  Within-Condition Responses to GUILTY 
 




Note:  Bars represent percentage of subjects in each experimental condition who 
either “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly” agreed with the statement, “Dave 
should be found guilty of rape.” 
 
Examination of individual differences revealed disagreement 
along a variety of lines, as Figure 3 indicates.  Moderately egalitarian 
subjects were more inclined than moderately hierarchical ones to 
agree that Dave should be found guilty.  Similarly, subjects who identi-
fied themselves as liberals were more inclined to agree with GUILTY 
than were subjects who identified themselves as conservatives; the dif-
ference among self-identified Democrats and self-identified Republi-
cans, however, was quite small.  Northeasterners were more inclined to 
agree that Dave should be convicted than were southerners, as were 
relatively young subjects (thirty years old or under) compared to rela-
tively old ones (sixty years old or over).  Subjects having graduated 
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from college were also more inclined to agree than were subjects lack-
ing a college degree. 
 
Figure 3:  Individual Differences (Across Conditions) on GUILTY 
 
“Dave should be found guilty of rape.” 
 
 
Note:  Bars represent percentage of subjects defined by specified characteristic who 
either “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly” agreed with the statement, “Dave 
should be found guilty of rape.”  “Hierarchs” comprise subjects whose score on the 
Hierarchy scale places them in the top one-third of the sample; “Egalitarians,” those 
whose score places them in the bottom third.  Liberals included subjects who se-
lected either “liberal” or “very liberal” on the five-point political-ideology scale; 
Conservatives, subjects who selected either “conservative” or “very conservative.” 
 
Examination of simple response frequencies revealed no meaning-
ful gender or race differences.  Aggregating responses across condi-
tions, 58% of both men and women agreed with GUILTY, while 60% 
of African-Americans and 57% of whites did. 
As displayed in Figure 4, there were signs of disagreement, howev-
er, between groups defined by combinations of gender, cultural 
worldview, and age.  Only 45% of relatively hierarchical female sub-
jects aged sixty or over agreed with GUILTY.  This was a level of sup-
port for conviction lower than that expressed by younger hierarchical 
female subjects (56%) and by both relatively young and relatively old 
hierarchical male subjects (50% and 52%, respectively).  Levels of 
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support for conviction among relatively egalitarian subjects were com-
parable for men and women, but lower among relatively older ones 
(men 64%, women 61%) than among relatively younger ones (women 
77%, men 75%). 
 
Figure 4:  Individual Differences (Across Conditions) on GUILTY by  
Age, Gender, and Worldview 
 




Note:  Bars represent percentage of subjects defined by characteristic who either 
“slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly” agreed with the statement, “Dave should be 
found guilty of rape.”  “Hierarchs” comprise subjects whose score on the Hie-
rarchy scale places them in the top one-third of the sample; “Egalitarians,” those 
whose score places them in the bottom third. 
 
Individual differences within conditions were comparable to 
those across them.  Moderately egalitarian and moderately hierar-
chical subjects, for example, divided 68% to 54% and 68% to 62% in 
the reform and “no means no” conditions, respectively, while men 
and women divided 62% to 61% and 66% to 65% in those two condi-
tions, respectively. 
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b.  Multivariate Analysis 
In an ordered logistic regression, the experimental conditions and 
the subjects’ individual characteristics (including their worldview 
scores) were treated as predictors of subjects’ responses to GUILTY.  
The results, reported in Table 1, Model 1, reflect the impact of each 
predictor when every other predictor is held constant at its mean.  To 
facilitate testing of the study hypotheses, the underlying regression 
formula was used to derive and compare estimates of the effects of dif-
ferences in individual predictors and relevant combinations of them, 




169 See generally GELMAN & HILL, supra note 158, at 137-66 (explaining the use of 
simulation, or “summarizing inferences by random numbers,” as a way to analyze re-
gressions and linear models); Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 8, at 870-72 (de-
scribing the benefits of using Clarify statistical software over “conventional regression 
analysis”); Tomz, Wittenberg & King, supra note 162 (explaining how to use Clarify sta-
tistical software).  To facilitate straightforward interpretation, the simulations were used 
to compute the probabilities, with associated standard errors and confidence intervals, 
that a subject would agree at any level (“slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly”) or disag-
ree at any level in response to GUILTY and other individual items. 
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No Definition -0.17 (0.15) 0.01 (0.10) 0.05 (0.15) 0.12 (0.15) 
“No Means No” 0.44 (0.15) -0.28 (0.10) -0.43 (0.15) -0.46 (0.15) 
Strict Liability 0.04 (0.14) -0.05 (0.10) -0.10 (0.15) -0.15 (0.15) 
Reform 0.16 (0.15) -0.07 (0.10) 0.02 (0.15) -0.15 (0.15) 
Male -0.41 (0.31) 0.46 (0.20) 0.89 (0.32) 0.45 (0.31) 
White 0.05 (0.17) -0.16 (0.11) -0.21 (0.17) -0.26 (0.17) 
Other Minority 0.04 (0.20) -0.16 (0.13) -0.04 (0.20) -0.18 (0.20) 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
Income -0.03 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 
Education 0.07 (0.04) -0.05 (0.02) -0.13 (0.04) -0.06 (0.04) 
Urbanicity 0.00 (0.09) -0.01 (0.06) -0.05 (0.09) -0.01 (0.09) 
Jewish 0.20 (0.37) -0.06 (0.24) -0.11 (0.39) -0.15 (0.37) 
Protestant 0.04 (0.14) -0.08 (0.09) -0.13 (0.15) -0.12 (0.14) 
Catholic -0.10 (0.15) 0.05 (0.10) 0.24 (0.15) 0.07 (0.15) 
Other Christian 0.04 (0.16) -0.05 (0.10) 0.07 (0.16) -0.12 (0.16) 
Non-Jew/Christ -0.07 (0.19) 0.01 (0.13) 0.16 (0.19) 0.04 (0.19) 
Northeast 0.33 (0.14) -0.21 (0.09) -0.38 (0.15) -0.44 (0.14) 
Midwest 0.10 (0.12) -0.07 (0.08) -0.21 (0.12) -0.21 (0.12) 
Far West 0.31 (0.14) -0.12 (0.09) -0.15 (0.14) -0.33 (0.14) 
Mountain -0.03 (0.19) 0.04 (0.13) -0.07 (0.19) -0.21 (0.19) 
Libcon 0.07 (0.07) -0.06 (0.04) -0.12 (0.06) -0.15 (0.06) 
Democrat -0.18 (0.15) 0.17 (0.10) 0.24 (0.16) 0.17 (0.16) 
Other Party -0.49 (0.25) 0.33 (0.16) 0.35 (0.24) 0.46 (0.24) 
Independent 0.03 (0.14) -0.04 (0.09) -0.07 (0.14) -0.03 (0.14) 
Hierarch -0.49 (0.09) 0.40 (0.06) 0.66 (0.09) 0.50 (0.09) 
Individ 0.04 (0.07) 0.02 (0.05) 0.05 (0.08) 0.09 (0.07) 
Hierarch x Male 0.15 (0.09) -0.13 (0.06) -0.26 (0.09) -0.15 (0.09) 
R 2  0.07  0.09  0.11  0.08  
 
Note:  N = 1500.  Models 1, 3, and 4 are ordered logistical regressions (logit coeffi-
cients).  Model 2 is an OLS linear regression (unstandardized beta weight coeffi-
cients).  Bolded coefficients are significant at p  0.05.  Standard errors are in pa-
rentheses.  R 2 for models 1, 3, and 4 reflects McKelvey and Zavonia pseudo R 2. 
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Figure 5:  Effect of Individual Characteristics on Agreement with GUILTY 
 
“Dave should be found guilty of rape.” 
 
Note:  N = 1500.  Derived from multivariate regression (Table 1, Model 1).  Bars 
indicate percentage-point difference in likelihood of agreeing (either “slightly,” 
“moderately,” or “strongly”) with GUILTY when predictors in the regression are 
set at the indicated values on the left-hand side of “vs.” as opposed to the indicated 
values on the right-hand side of “vs.” (controlling for all other predictors).  Confi-
dence intervals reflect 0.95 level of confidence.  Values for “egalitarian” and “hie-
rarchical” are set one standard deviation from the mean in the specified direction 
on the Hierarchy/Egalitarianism scale.  Values for “liberal” and “conservative” are 
set one standard deviation from the mean in the specified direction on the liber-
al/conservative ideology scale. 
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The first study hypothesis was that the law would not matter very 
much—that is, that subjects’ outcome judgments would be fairly in-
sensitive to the experimental condition to which they were assigned.  
This hypothesis was borne out with respect to the reform and strict-
liability conditions.  Relative to being assigned to the common law 
condition, being assigned to either of these conditions had no statisti-
cally significant (or practically meaningful) effect on the likelihood 
that a subject would agree (at any level) rather than disagree (at any 
level) with GUILTY.  Nor did being assigned to the common law con-
dition predict a significant (or meaningful) difference in the likeli-
hood of agreeing with GUILTY relative to being assigned to the no-
definition condition. 
Being assigned to the “no means no” condition, however, did pre-
dict a significant (and arguably meaningful) difference in the likeli-
hood of conviction.  All else equal, being assigned to that condition 
predicted a 10.6 percentage-point increase in the likelihood of agree-
ing with GUILTY (± 6.9%),170 relative to being assigned to the common 
law condition. 
Consistent with the second study hypothesis, however, the effect as-
sociated with individuals’ cultural identities was substantially larger.  All 
else equal, the difference between being moderately hierarchical and 
moderately egalitarian in outlooks (that is, having worldview scores that 
rank one standard deviation from the mean in the specified direction 
on the Hierarchy/Egalitarianism scale) was 22.8% (± 7.6%).  Consis-
tent with the third study hypothesis, being hierarchical predicted disa-
greement with GUILTY, and being egalitarian, agreement with it. 
 
170 The “±” margin of error in this and other textual references indicates the loca-
tion of the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval for the estimated 
probability.  Accordingly, there is a 95% chance that the “true” probability is within the 
range between the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval.  Confidence 
intervals are more informative than simple p-values, both because they convey the pre-
cision of estimates that are significantly different from zero and because they enable 
meaningful information to be gleaned about estimates that are not “significantly differ-
ent” from zero (e.g., that values outside a confidence interval that crosses zero are un-
likely).  Jacob Cohen, The Earth Is Round (p < .05), 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 997 (1994).  
Because the confidence interval reflects the standard error of the estimate, not all val-
ues within the range are equally likely; values become more likely as they approach the 
estimated value—which is the best or most likely estimate—and progressively less likely 
as they approach the extremes of the confidence interval.  See generally JACOB COHEN, 
PATRICIA COHEN, STEPHEN G. WEST & LEONA S. AIKEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRES-
SION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 42-44 (3d ed. 2003) (ex-
plaining how to determine a 95% confidence interval for a regression coefficient). 
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The fourth study hypothesis was that other individual characteris-
tics would affect outcome judgments, if at all, consistently with the rela-
tionship they have with hierarchical and egalitarian cultural styles.  In 
line with this hypothesis, being a southerner rather than a northeas-
terner predicted an 8.0% (± 6.4%) increase in the likelihood of disa-
greeing with GUILTY.  Once other variables were controlled for, nei-
ther liberal/conservative ideology nor party affiliation—characteristics 
that correlate with, but usually are less consequential than, cultural 
worldview171—predicted a significant (or practically meaningful) differ-
ence in the likelihood of agreeing that Dave should be convicted.  Race 
also did not significantly influence responses to GUILTY. 
Once other variables were controlled for, neither age nor educa-
tion—characteristics that seemed to matter in an examination of sim-
ple response frequencies—was statistically significant on its own.  
When aggregated, however, these influences did predict a significant 
effect:  all else equal, a twenty-one-year-old just graduated from college 
is 9.7 percentage points (± 7.7%) more likely to agree with GUILTY 
than is a sixty-year-old who has only a high school degree. 
The influence of gender fit the study hypotheses.  On its own, gend-
er did not meaningfully influence responses to GUILTY.  Controlling 
for other influences, being female rather than male predicted a 2.6% 
decrease in the likelihood of agreeing that Dave should be convicted, but 
with margin of error (± 4.6%) that rendered that effect nonsignificant. 
Gender did exert a meaningful effect, however, in conjunction with 
culture.  A Hierarchy-gender interaction term—Hierarch x Male—was 
included in the analysis to test the hypothesis that subscribing to hie-
rarchical values would incline women to favor acquittal even more than 
men.  The negative sign of the interaction coefficient—indicating that 
hierarchical values influence subjects toward acquittal less powerfully 
when they are male—is consistent with this hypothesis.  The effect of 
Hierarch x Male is only marginally significant on its own (p = 0.08), 
but because its impact depends on its joint effect with Hierarchy and 
Male, the consequence of the gender-culture interaction is more reli-
ably and meaningfully tested by statistical simulation.172  Such analysis 
showed that, all else equal, being moderately hierarchical and female 
as opposed to moderately hierarchical and male predicted a 6.8% 
 
171 See Kahan, Braman, Monahan, Callahan & Peters, supra note 105 (arguing that 
cultural values affect attitudes toward outpatient-commitment laws and other policy 
issues). 
172 See GELMAN & HILL, supra note 158, at 94 ( justifying the inclusion of borderline-
significant interactions in the simulation of a logistic regression model). 
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(± 6.4%) decrease in the likelihood of favoring conviction.  Being mod-
erately egalitarian and female as opposed to moderately egalitarian 
and male, in contrast, did not have a statistically (or practically) signif-
icant effect (a 1.4%, ± 6.0%, increase in likelihood of agreeing).  In 
other words, all else equal, among hierarchical subjects gender dis-
posed women to be more proacquittal than men but had no meaning-
ful effect among egalitarians.  By the same token, the difference asso-
ciated with being hierarchical as opposed to egalitarian was larger for 
women (-26.9%, ± 8.9%) than for men (-18.7%, ± 8.3%). 
The impact of gender in conjunction with both hierarchy and age, 
moreover, was also statistically significant.  Whereas neither being a 
woman rather than a man, nor being sixty rather than twenty-one 
years old, affects outcome judgments, being a hierarchical sixty-year-
old woman as opposed to a hierarchical twenty-one-year-old man pre-
dicts an 11.5% (± 8.6%) decrease in the likelihood of agreeing with 
GUILTY, all else equal.  The impact is larger still—a 30.2% (± 10.8%) 
decrease in likelihood—when the subject is a hierarchical sixty-year-
old woman as opposed to an egalitarian twenty-one-year-old man, all 
else equal.  (Being a sixty-year-old egalitarian woman as opposed to a 
twenty-one-year-old egalitarian male, in contrast, does not meaningful-
ly affect the likelihood of supporting conviction.)  A defendant in a 
date-rape case, then, might well be better off with an older, traditional 
woman on his jury than with one of his own peers. 
2.  Fact Perceptions 
a.  Preliminary Analyses 
Disagreement on the fact items was uneven, as Figure 6 shows.  
Across conditions, a relatively large majority—72%—agreed that “[b]y 
saying ‘no’ several times, Lucy made it clear to Dave that she did not 
consent to sexual intercourse.”  Nevertheless, majorities also agreed 
that “if [Lucy] had really meant not to consent to sexual intercourse” 
she “would have tried to push Dave off of her” (66%) and “would have 
tried to leave the dormitory room” (63%).  Sixty-three percent also 
agreed that “Dave believed that Lucy consented to sexual intercourse,” 
and 46% agreed that “[g]iven all the circumstances, it would have been 
reasonable for Dave to believe Lucy consented to sexual intercourse.” 
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Note:  Bars indicate percentage of subjects in all conditions combined who either 
“slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly” agreed with the indicated item. 
 
Overall, then, the responses seem to indicate ambivalence, stemming 
from the absence of physical resistance, about whether Lucy’s “no” com-
municated lack of consent.  Indeed, 40% of the subjects, across condi-
tions, indicated that they agreed that “[d]espite what she said or might 
have felt after, Lucy really did consent to sexual intercourse with Dave.” 
Ambivalence notwithstanding, responses to the eleven fact items 
formed a highly reliable six-point scale ( = 0.93), the coherence of 
which would not have been increased by the exclusion of any of the 
items.  The scale was assigned the label “DEF_FACTS,” which measures 
on a six-point scale how disposed subjects are toward a generic pro-
defendant understanding of the facts. 
As reflected in Figure 7, differences in mean scores on 
DEF_FACTS—the composite scale comprising the various fact-
perception items—parallel those in outcome judgments.  Relative to 
subjects who were hierarchical, conservative, Republican, or southern, 
subjects who were egalitarian, liberal, Democrat, or northeastern all 
formed anti-defendant factual views.  Well-educated subjects were also 
more disposed toward an anti-defendant view of the facts.  Differences 
were small (and statistically nonsignificant) among men and women, 
among whites and African-Americans, and among relatively young and 
relatively old subjects. 
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Figure 7:  Individual Differences in Fact Perceptions 
 
 
Note:  Bars indicate group mean on 6-point DEF_FACTS scale (all experimental 
conditions combined).  Confidence intervals reflect 0.95 level of confidence.  
“Hierarchs” comprise subjects whose score on the Hierarchy scale places them in 
the top one-third of the sample; “Egalitarians,” those whose score places them in 
the bottom third.  Liberals included subjects who selected either “liberal” or “very 
liberal” on the five-point political-ideology scale; Conservatives, subjects who 
selected either “conservative” or “very conservative.” 
b.  Multivariate Analyses 
Multivariate analyses were performed on subjects’ factual percep-
tions as well.  Model 2 of Table 1 reports a linear regression analysis, in 
which subjects’ scores on the DEF_FACTS scale were regressed on the 
experimental conditions and on subjects’ individual characteristics.  
The practical upshot of these effects is easier to comprehend, howev-
er, by examining how they influence the probability that subjects will 
agree or disagree with particular fact items.  Such an examination is 
facilitated here by an additional ordered logistic regression analysis 
and statistical simulation of responses to CONSENT—“[d]espite what 
she said or might have felt after, Lucy really did consent to sexual in-
tercourse with Dave”—the results of which are reported in Model 3 of 
Table 1 and Figure 8. 
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Figure 8:  Effect of Individual Characteristics on  
Agreement with CONSENT 
 
“Despite what she said or might have felt after, Lucy  
really did consent to sexual intercourse with Dave.” 
 
 
Note:  N = 1500.  Derived from multivariate regression (Table 1, Model 3).  Bars indicate 
percentage-point difference in likelihood of agreeing (either “slightly,” “moderately,” or 
“strongly”) with CONSENT when predictors in the regression are set at the indicated val-
ues on the left-hand side of “vs.” as opposed to the indicated values on the right-hand side 
of “vs.” (controlling for all other predictors).  Confidence intervals reflect 0.95 level of 
confidence.  Values for “egalitarian” and “hierarchical” are set one standard deviation 
from the mean in the specified direction on the Hierarchy/Egalitarianism scale. 
   
15 KAHAN FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2010  6:10 PM 
2010] Culture, Cognition, and Consent 787 
Results largely paralleled the ones observed in the analysis of sub-
jects’ outcome judgments.  Thus, a hierarchical worldview disposed 
subjects toward a relatively pro-defendant view of the facts; an egalita-
rian one, toward a relatively anti-defendant view of the facts.  All else 
equal, a subject was 27.7 percentage points (± 7.8%) more likely to 
agree that Lucy in fact consented, notwithstanding her verbal resis-
tance, when that subject was moderately hierarchical rather than 
moderately egalitarian in outlook.  This result is consistent with both 
the second study hypothesis—that cultural identity would have rela-
tively strong effects on subjects’ fact perceptions—and with the third, 
which related to the valence of those effects. 
Multivariate testing also largely supported the fourth study hypo-
thesis—that other individual characteristics would have either no influ-
ence or would reinforce cultural differences.  Race had no significant 
or meaningful impact on DEF_FACTS score.  Nor did party affiliation 
or ideology.  In a pattern consistent with the hypothesized effect of cul-
tural styles, being from the Northeast as opposed to the South pre-
dicted anti-defendant fact perceptions.  Increased education also had 
anti-defendant impact, an effect not specifically hypothesized. 
Again, consistent with the fourth study hypothesis, the influence of 
gender was conditional on culture.  The negative (and statistically sig-
nificant) coefficient for Hierarch x Male in the multivariate regression 
model for DEF_FACTS indicates that the influence of hierarchy on 
fact perceptions was smaller for men than for women.  Being simulta-
neously hierarchical and female, in other words, generates the most po-
tent predisposition to see the facts in a pro-defendant light. 
The practical importance of the gender-culture interaction can be 
most easily comprehended by examining its effect on subject res-
ponses to CONSENT, in particular, as shown in Figure 8.  By itself, and 
controlling for other influences, gender did not exert a meaningful 
impact on the perception that “Lucy really did consent to sexual inter-
course with Dave” despite saying “no.”  But conditional on cultural 
worldview, gender did matter:  all else equal, being a moderately hie-
rarchical woman rather than a moderately hierarchical man predicts a 
7.6% increase (± 6.6%) in the belief that Lucy actually consented.  
This margin again increases slightly with age, to 10.9% (± 9.3%), for a 
sixty-year-old moderately hierarchical woman as opposed to a twenty-
one-year-old moderately hierarchical man.  There is no meaningful 
difference associated with that age differential (all else equal) between 
moderately egalitarian women and men.  When age is controlled for, 
being moderately egalitarian and female as opposed to moderately 
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egalitarian and male predicts a nonsignificant decrease (-5.5%, 
± 5.6%) in the likelihood of agreeing with CONSENT. 
Indeed, the analysis suggests not only that gender conflict on per-
ceptions of consent is highly culture specific, but also that the degree 
of conflict between cultural types is highly gender specific.  All else 
equal, being moderately hierarchical rather than moderately egalita-
rian did make men more likely to agree (21.1%, ± 8.3%) that Lucy 
“really did consent.”  But the impact of being moderately hierarchical 
rather than moderately egalitarian was substantially larger (34.2%, 
± 8.6%) among women. 
As it did in responses to GUILTY, only assignment to the “no 
means no” condition had an impact on subjects’ perceptions of the 
facts relative to the ones that subjects formed in the common law con-
dition.  Consistent with the effect it had on outcome judgments, as-
signment to the “no means no” condition disposed subjects, all else 
equal, to an anti-defendant attitude toward the facts.  Relative to being 
assigned to the common law condition, being assigned to the “no 
means no” condition predicted a 10.1 percentage-point difference 
(± 6.8%) in the likelihood that subjects would agree (either “slightly,” 
“moderately,” or “strongly”) with CONSENT. 
The impact of the “no means no” definition in arousing anti-
defendant fact perceptions was not anticipated.  The first study hypo-
thesis—that law would make relatively little difference—was concerned 
primarily with the influence of law on outcome judgments.  The basis 
of this hypothesis, however, was the expectation that individuals would 
be psychologically motivated to conform their perceptions of legally 
consequential facts in a manner that permitted them to reach a cultu-
rally congenial outcome no matter what legal definition of rape they 
were instructed to apply.  This prediction implied that individuals cul-
turally predisposed to favor acquittal would experience the greatest 
pressure to adopt a pro-defendant interpretation of the facts in the 
“no means no” condition.  By the same token, individuals disposed to 
favor conviction would experience the least pressure to adopt an anti-
defendant interpretation in the “no means no” condition because that 
definition required conviction even assuming the absence of force by 
Dave, the existence of a reasonable mistaken belief on his part that 
Lucy was willing to engage in sex despite her words, and even the 
presence of such willingness on her part—so long as it was found (as 
both parties testified) that she said “no.”  Accordingly, it would have 
been more consistent with the first study hypothesis for subjects’ fac-
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tual perceptions, all else equal, to be more pro-defendant, not less, in 
the “no means no” condition. 
Testing failed to disclose any significant or meaningful interaction 
between the experimental-condition variables and Hierarchy.  In other 
words, the impact of hierarchical values in inclining subjects toward a 
pro-defendant view of the facts and egalitarianism in inclining them 
toward an anti-defendant one was essentially uniform across the condi-
tions.  There was thus no support for the hypothesis that subjects 
would react to changes in legal definitions by shifting their percep-
tions of fact.  Indeed, the analysis supports the conclusion that being 
assigned to the “no means no” condition influenced relatively hierar-
chical subjects to form an anti-defendant view of the facts to the same 
extent as it influenced relatively egalitarian ones to do so. 
3.  Fairness 
a.  Preliminary Analyses 
Not surprisingly, responses to UNFAIR—“[i]t would be unfair to 
convict Dave of a crime as serious as rape”—were highly correlated 
(rs = -0.80) with GUILTY.  That is, subjects who agreed that “Dave 
should be found guilty of rape” generally perceived that this outcome 
would be fair, while those who perceived that convicting him would be 
unfair generally disagreed that he should be convicted.  This pattern 
might suggest that subjects conformed their outcome judgments to 
their independent view of the just outcome. 
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Figure 9:  Within-Condition Responses to UNFAIR 
 




Note:  Bars represent percentage of subjects in each experimental condition who 
either “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly” agreed with the statement, “It would 
be unfair to convict Dave of a crime as serious as rape.” 
 
But such an interpretation would be in tension with the unantici-
pated pattern of responses to UNFAIR within conditions, shown in 
Figure 9.  Whereas close to half (49%) of the subjects agreed that it 
would be unfair to convict in the common law condition, and nearly 
that many did in the strict-liability (44%) and reform conditions 
(43%), only about one-third (34%) took that view in the “no means 
no” condition.  Combined with the finding that a greater percentage 
of subjects agreed with GUILTY in the “no means no” condition,173 this 
result suggests that subjects in that condition conformed their percep-
tion of the fairness of convicting the defendant to their outcome judg-
ment, which was in turn affected, at least to some degree, by the speci-
fied definition of rape. 
 
173 See supra Figure 2. 
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b.  Multivariate Analysis 
This interpretation is also supported by a multivariate analysis that 
regresses UNFAIR on the study’s various predictor variables.  The 
analysis is reported in Model 4 of Table 1 and used to simulate pre-
dicted likelihoods of agreement as shown in Figure 10.  All else equal, 
being assigned to the “no means no” condition predicted a decrease of 
11.3 percentage points (± 6.6%) in the likelihood that a subject would 
agree that convicting Dave of “a crime as serious as rape” would be 
“unfair.”  Rather than rebel against the additional pressure to convict 
associated with the expansive “no means no” definition, then, subjects 
adapted by forming an attitude more supportive of conviction. 
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Figure 10:  Effect of Individual Characteristics on Agreement with UNFAIR 
 
“It would be unfair to convict Dave of a crime as serious as rape.” 
 
 
Note:  N = 1500.  Derived from multivariate regression (Table 1, Model 4).  Bars 
indicate percentage-point difference in likelihood of agreeing (either “slightly,” 
“moderately,” or “strongly”) with UNFAIR when predictors in the regression are 
set at the indicated values on the left-hand side of “vs.” as opposed to the indicated 
values on the right-hand side of “vs.” (controlling for all other predictors).  Confi-
dence intervals reflect 0.95 level of confidence.  Values for “egalitarian” and “hie-
rarchical” are set one standard deviation from the mean in the specified direction 
on the Hierarchy/Egalitarianism scale. 
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Moreover, tests failed to disclose any interaction between UNFAIR, 
the “no means no” condition variable, and Hierarchy.  In other words, 
being assigned to “no means no” generated as great a disposition to see 
conviction as fair among subjects disposed to a hierarchical worldview 
as it did among subjects disposed toward an egalitarian one. 
In other respects, responses to UNFAIR largely paralleled those to 
the fact-perception items.  A moderately hierarchical, as opposed to a 
moderately egalitarian, worldview predicted a 23.4% (± 7.8%) in-
crease in the likelihood that a subject would view conviction as unfair, 
all else equal.  Being hierarchical and female as opposed to egalita-
rian and female increased the likelihood of agreeing that conviction 
was unfair by 27.5% (± 9.1%).  A sixty-year-old hierarchical woman 
was 11.6% (± 8.9%) more likely to agree than was a twenty-one-year-
old hierarchical male. 
III.  RECONCEPTUALIZING AND REFOCUSING 
Largely consistent with the study hypotheses, the experiment re-
sults suggest that public beliefs about consent and verbal resistance to 
sex are more subtle and more complicated than is contemplated by 
the major positions in the “no means . . . ?” debate.  I now consider the 
empirical and normative implications of these results. 
A.  Interpreting the Empirical Evidence 
As a positive matter, the study suggests two principal conclusions.  
The first is that beliefs about the significance of verbal resistance to sex 
are culturally polarized.  As predicted, reactions to a case like Berkowitz 
divide individuals of opposing cultural styles.  The more egalitarian an 
individual’s worldview, the more inclined that person is to find that 
the defendant in such a case committed rape, while the more hierar-
chical an individual’s worldview, the more inclined that person is to 
find that he did not.  Other characteristics that cohere with these cul-
tural styles—such as region of residence and political ideology—point 
in the same direction (although the effect of the latter does not persist 
once cultural outlooks are controlled for).  Certain characteristics not 
clearly associated with these styles—such as education and income—
also matter, but not nearly as much. 
As the cultural-cognition thesis implies, cultural differences in out-
come judgments reflect cultural differences in perceptions of the facts.  
Individuals who subscribe to a hierarchical cultural style are more likely 
than those who subscribe to an egalitarian style to believe that the 
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complainant in a case like Berkowitz did consent and that the defendant 
honestly and reasonably believed she did.  Hierarchically disposed sub-
jects are also more likely to believe that the defendant did not engage 
in force or put the complainant in fear.  The evidence supports the hy-
pothesis, then, that individuals are motivated to form perceptions of 
fact that assure a congenial relationship between the expressive judg-
ment of the law and the norms these persons use to evaluate the cha-
racter of the parties in an alleged acquaintance-rape scenario. 
This finding does not fit comfortably with the premises of any of the 
major positions in the “no means . . . ?” debate.  Contrary to the stan-
dard feminist critique,174 disagreements over the significance of “no” 
cannot be attributed to a conflict between opposing male and female 
“points of view.”  Because cultural differences cut across gender, there is 
not a meaningful difference among men and women per se on what the 
facts are or on what the outcome should be in a case like Berkowitz. 
Indeed, the individuals most inclined to form pro-defendant per-
ceptions are hierarchical women, particularly older ones.  This finding 
also fits the cultural-cognition thesis.  Within the hierarchical 
worldview, token resistance to sex is understood as a strategy by wom-
en who desire casual sex to disguise their lack of virtue relative to 
women who faithfully adhere to hierarchical norms against forming 
and acting on such desires.  Women who are strongly committed to a 
hierarchical worldview, then, are disposed more readily to perceive 
that women are saying “no” while meaning “yes”—and to condemn 
them for that—because women who have succeeded in fulfilling 
gender-role expectations within a hierarchical way of life are the ones 
with the greatest identity-protective stake in law’s affirmation of hie-
rarchical norms.  Thus, far from reflecting a dispute among women 
and men, contestation about the significance of the word “no” in cases 
like Berkowitz features a conflict primarily among women on how the 
indulgence of the desire for sex outside of relationships sanctioned by 
hierarchical norms should affect women’s social status. 
This account also fits uneasily with the conventionalist and norm-
reconstructionist positions.175  The cultural logic of token resistance 
makes it odd to describe it as a convention.  Not only do hierarchs and 
egalitarians attach different significance to the same words and ac-
tions, but even among hierarchs the perception that “no” means some-
 
174 See supra text accompanying notes 63-67. 
175 See supra text accompanying notes 68-78 (for the conventionalist viewpoint) and 
81-84 (for the norm-reconstructionist position). 
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thing other than “no” is most vivid in the minds of women (dispropor-
tionately women well beyond “dating” age) who form this 
ing not to perfect their own ability to convey their intentions to poten-
tial sex partners but rather to help identify other women whose 
behavior threatens their status. 
Of course, the conflict that the “no means . . . ?” debate provokes 
among women by no means implies that exoneration of men like the 
defendant in Berkowitz is compatible with gender equality.  From a fe-
minist perspective, hierarchy is a cultural way of life that subordinates 
women.176  Cultural cognition shows only that one of the mechanisms 
by which hierarchy promotes this state of affairs is by shaping the fac-
tual perceptions of women, as well as men, who subscribe to a hierar-
chical worldview.  Far from undermining the feminist critique, this in-
sight should be understood to fortify it by furnishing a psychologically 
realistic account of why members of a group whose well-being is dis-
served by a legal institution or practice might nevertheless form be-
liefs, attitudes, and preferences that perpetuate it.177 
The second major conclusion of the experimental study is that var-
iations in the legal definition of rape have a minimal influence on the 
judgment that rape either did or did not occur in a case like Berkowitz.  
In fact, the two most commonly proposed and adopted reforms of the 
traditional common law definition—dispensing with the “force or 
threat of force” element and eliminating any “mistake” defense—have 
no effect:  there was no meaningful difference in the outcome judg-
ments of subjects instructed to apply the “strict liability,” “reform,” or 
“common law” formulation, on the one hand, and those furnished no 
definition of rape at all, on the other.  This result is consistent with the 
general finding that legal definitions exert less force than do lay proto-
types of common crimes.178 
 
176 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Desire and Power, Talk at the Conference on 
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture at the University of Illinois at Champaign-
Urbana ( July 11, 1983), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:  DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 46, 
52-53 (1987); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance:  On Sex Discrimi-
nation, Speech at Harvard Law School (Oct. 24, 1984), as reprinted in FEMINISM UNMO-
DIFIED:  DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW, supra, at 32, 32-45 (1987). 
177 See generally JON ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX 1-5, 18-22, 459-68 (1985) (cri-
ticizing classic accounts of ideology for adopting a functionalist assumption that indi-
vidual actions can be explained by the contribution they make to the ends of collective 
entities, and proposing that social-psychological mechanisms be used to make the con-
cept of  “ideology” compatible with “methodological individualism”).  I am indebted to 
Devon Carbado for making me aware of both the unmistakable importance of this 
point and the importance of stating it unmistakably. 
178 See Smith, supra note 135. 
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Not adopted in any jurisdiction, a definition that treats proof the 
complainant said “no” as sufficient to establish lack of consent and 
(when the defendant heard her) the requisite mens rea did increase 
the proportion of subjects who agreed the defendant had raped the 
complainant.  However, the modest size of the increase—around 10%—
only underscores how resistant individuals’ outcome judgments are to 
legal override.  In the vignette, the parties both testified that the com-
plainant repeatedly said “no” before and during intercourse; as a result, 
there was seemingly no basis under the “no means no” definition for 
disputing the defendant’s guilt.  Nevertheless, more than one-third of 
the subjects instructed to apply the “no means no” definition—about 
75% as many as were instructed to apply the common law definition—
continued to believe the defendant should not be found guilty. 
Indeed, the study suggests the impact of the “no means no” defini-
tion could well be dominated, as a practical matter, by the cultural 
predispositions of the jurors.  The “no means no” definition would be 
unlikely to affect outcomes in a jurisdiction in which citizens share rel-
atively egalitarian worldviews, because jurors in such a community 
would be highly likely to convict even under the common law defini-
tion.  In a jurisdiction dominated by individuals subscribing to relative-
ly hierarchical worldviews—especially one in the South—the differ-
ence a “no means no” definition would make would likely be too small 
to overcome the strong resistance to conviction in a case like Berkowitz.  
In a jurisdiction in which potential jurors might be either egalitarian 
or hierarchical, lawyers would continue to recognize jury selection, as 
they do now, as the decisive stage of the case. 
Nonetheless, the study also furnished little support for the idea, 
advanced by conventionalists and accepted by some ambivalent norm 
reconstructionists, that a reform as radical (legally speaking) as “no 
means no” would generate a self-defeating backlash.179  As indicated, 
subjects instructed to apply this definition were modestly more likely 
to agree that the defendant should be convicted of rape.  Even more 
important, there was no evidence that those who might have favored 
acquittal under the common law definition regarded conviction under 
the “no means no” standard as unjust.  On the contrary, subjects who 
received the “no means no” instruction were more likely than those 
who received the common law, strict-liability, or reform definitions (or 
no definition at all) to concur in the fairness of such an outcome.  
 
179 See supra text accompanying notes 92-95. 
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This result, moreover, was uniform across subjects of all worldviews, 
hierarchical as well as egalitarian. 
This finding suggests some degree of support for norm reconstruc-
tionists’ belief that legal reform can be effective in changing sexual 
mores.  Subjects assigned to the “no means no” condition adapted 
their moral assessment of the defendant’s behavior to their legal as-
sessment of it, probably to avoid the cognitive dissonance associated 
with having to acknowledge a conflict between following the law and 
adhering to their values.180  No such effect was hypothesized, and this 
finding marks an important qualification on the cultural-cognition the-
sis, which in its strongest form predicts that individuals will conform 
their perceptions of the facts as well as their resulting outcome judg-
ments to their cultural predispositions for identity-protective reasons. 
In the experiment, this effect is real but small.  How large it would 
be were the “no means no” formulation actually adopted in the real 
world would likely depend on social influences.181  Exposure to peers 
who are moved by the “no means no” formulation to change their 
moral assessments of the behavior of a man like the defendant in Ber-
kowitz could cause a similar change in perspective among those who 
wouldn’t have modified their view in isolation.  If that happened, such 
a reform might succeed in effecting a significant change in norms 
even among hierarchs.  Or perhaps those who are inclined to change 
their views inside the lab wouldn’t outside of it if they were exposed to 
peers or culturally influential opinion leaders who continued to be-
lieve that a case like Berkowitz wasn’t “even remotely about rape”182 even 
if the law insists that “no” always means “no.” 
Additional studies aimed at assessing how cultural cognition inte-
racts with social influences, particularly when individuals deliberate, 
are necessary to determine which of these scenarios is more probable.  
Nevertheless, the existence and valence of the norm-shaping effect ob-
served in this study suggests that the risk that “shoving” norms with the 
law will provoke a self-reinforcing wave of resistance is not as great as 
some commentators have warned.183 
 
180 See generally Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology, and Morality (sur-
veying literature on the impact of law on formation of individual moral outlooks), in 50 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING & MOTIVATION 101 (Daniel M. Bartels et al. eds., 2009). 
181 See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 
349, 353-58 (1997) (explaining the cumulative effects of group influence). 
182 See supra text accompanying notes 41-42. 
183 See Kahan, supra note 95, at 623. 
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B.  Reconsidering What’s at Stake 
The dominant concern of the normative debate over rape-law 
reform has been individual autonomy:  how to balance the interest of 
women in avoiding being misunderstood when they say “no” against the 
interests of men who could go to jail for misunderstanding them.  The 
impact of cultural cognition on perceptions of consent suggests the de-
bate should also be focused on something else:  how the law should re-
spond to cultural status competition over disputed claims of fact. 
The conventionalist defense of the common law reflects a basic 
misapprehension about how perceptions of token resistance are dis-
tributed.  The conventionalists’ concern about the liberty of nonculp-
able defendants assumes that men who rely on conventions for initia-
tion of consensual sex might misunderstand a woman like the 
complainant in Berkowitz when she says “no.”  The study’s results, how-
ever, suggest that young, sexually active men and women, particularly 
ones who share cultural styles, are unlikely to misunderstand each 
other in that situation; such persons form comparable impressions 
when they consider the facts in Berkowitz.  The individuals most likely 
to perceive that “no” means “yes” in such a case are older hierarchical 
women, many of whom are motivated by a form of status anxiety to 
perceive token resistance.  These women might well be surprised were 
the law to take the position that a defendant in that sort of case is 
guilty of rape.  The occasion for their surprise, however, will not likely 
be any miscommunication between them and their sexual partners, 
much less a miscommunication that unexpectedly puts them at risk of 
criminal punishment! 
For the same reason, it is hard to credit the conventionalist anxiety 
that rape-law reform would abridge the sexual autonomy of women.  
The persons most likely to oppose a legal rule that treats the word 
“no” as dispositive evidence of the lack of consent and the absence of 
mistake—older, hierarchical women—are not motivated by an expec-
tation that such a rule would interfere with a ritual women find sexual-
ly pleasurable; rather, they are intent on conserving the contribution 
that law makes to the stigmatization of women they perceive as seeking 
pleasure in casual sex. 
At the same time, there is also no strong basis for believing that rape-
law reform enhances the autonomy of women who say “no” and mean it.  
The standard critique and norm-reconstruction positions ignore the 
dominance of culture over law.  Being committed to a hierarchical 
worldview strongly disposes persons (particularly women) to perceive 
that a woman who says “no” is merely feigning nonconsent.  Neither of the 
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dominant forms of rape-law reforms—eliminating the “force or threat of 
force” element and treating rape as a strict-liability crime—would appear 
to make those persons (or anyone else, for that matter) any more likely 
to find the defendant guilty in a case like Berkowitz. 
It’s conceivable, the study’s results suggest, that the more radical 
reform of treating the word “no” as dispositive proof of the complai-
nant’s lack of consent and the defendant’s mens rea would increase 
the willingness of even hierarchs to convict in such a case.  However, 
the effect of this formulation remains weak compared to the strength 
of cultural styles.  Whether it would increase the likelihood of convic-
tion enough to overcome the even stronger influence of decisionmak-
ers’ cultural predispositions (either immediately or over time through 
norm reconstruction) is at best a matter of conjecture. 
The only certain effect of any sort of reform is expressive.  Laws 
have meanings as well as consequences.184  By securing enactment of 
any type of “reform” statute—whether in a hierarchical jurisdiction or 
an egalitarian one in which conviction is already likely under the 
common law—supporters of such a measure attain a powerful token of 
the political community’s repudiation of hierarchic gender norms.  
“Affirmation through law and governmental acts expresses the public 
worth of one subculture’s norms relative to those of others, demon-
strating which cultures have legitimacy and public domination”;185 
“[w]hatever its instrumental effects,”186 law’s expressive function “en-
hances the social status of groups carrying the affirmed culture and 
degrades groups carrying that which is condemned as deviant.”187  By 
the same token, avoiding symbolic defeat of that sort, and visiting it in-
stead on their egalitarian adversaries, supplies the opponents of the 
standard reforms with motivation to resist the elimination of the “force 
or threat of force” element and the mistake defense—whether or not 
such changes in the law will have any behavioral impact.  This sort of 
symbolic status conflict is what impels cautious elected officials, con-
cerned with their self-preservation, to seek refuge in the sort of ambi-
guity that characterized Pennsylvania’s post-Berkowitz reforms. 
The political “no means . . . ?” controversy can be assimilated to a 
class of legal and policy disputes that feature cultural polarization over 
 
184 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 948 
(1995) (examining how the “law helps construct social reality”). 
185  See Joseph R. Gusfield, On Legislating Morals:  The Symbolic Process of Designating 
Deviance, 56 CAL. L. REV. 54, 58 (1968). 
186 Id. at 59. 
187 Id. at 58.  
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disputed facts.  Rape-reform laws are obviously not the only form of 
regulation the consequences of which are heatedly disputed.  Individ-
ual citizens lack the means to figure out on their own whether the 
death penalty deters murder;188 whether private ownership of guns will 
increase or decrease crime;189 whether reducing carbon emissions will 
have any beneficial effect on climate change (is that a real threat, by 
the way?) or instead only hamper attainment of the wealth necessary 
to perfect climate-cooling technologies (will those work?  aren’t they 
unacceptably risky?);190 and like questions.  To avoid dissonance, they 
tend to be drawn to the answers that fit best with (or at least avoid 
doing violence to) their fundamental values.191  They might (indeed, 
almost certainly will) try to compensate for their lack of personal 
knowledge by seeking out the views of informed and trustworthy ex-
perts.192  But, not surprisingly, the experts whom they are most likely to 
 
188 Compare Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Does Capi-
tal Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect?  New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. 
L. & ECON. REV. 344, 373 (2003) (using empirical data to conclude that the deterrent 
effect of the death penalty is “significant”), with John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses 
and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 
(2005) (describing the existing evidence for deterrence as “surprisingly fragile”). 
189 Compare JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME:  UNDERSTANDING CRIME 
AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS 117 (2d ed. 2000) (confirming the “deterrence effect of con-
cealed-handgun laws”), with Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More 
Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1201 (2003) (arguing that “the sta-
tistical evidence that these laws have reduced crime is limited, sporadic, and extraordi-
narily fragile”).  See generally COMM. TO IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. & DATA ON FIREARMS, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE:  A CRITICAL REVIEW 150 (Charles 
F. Wellford et al. eds., 2005) (summarizing the literature on right-to-carry laws and 
concluding that “with the current evidence it is not possible to determine that there is a 
causal link between the passage of [such] laws and crime rates”). 
190 Compare AL GORE, THE ASSAULT ON REASON 212 (2007) (asserting that “[w]hen 
there is no effort to restrain the global warming pollution gases, then global warming 
gets worse”), and Richard Monastersky, Climate Crunch:  A Burden Beyond Bearing, 458 
NATURE 1091 (2009) (reviewing studies showing the benefits of reducing carbon emis-
sions), and Oliver Morton, Climate Crunch:  Great White Hope, 458 NATURE 1097 (2009) 
(evaluating the utility of geoengineering as a response to the climate-change crisis), 
and D.P. Van Vuuren et al., Temperature Increase of 21st Century Mitigation Scenarios, 105 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15,258, 15,262 (2008) (finding that “even the lowest scenarios 
available . . . lead to considerable increases in global mean temperature”), with ROY W. 
SPENCER, CLIMATE CONFUSION:  HOW GLOBAL WARMING HYSTERIA LEADS TO BAD 
SCIENCE, PANDERING POLITICIANS, AND MISGUIDED POLICIES THAT HURT THE POOR 161 
(2008) (arguing that “most of the currently proposed policies for ‘doing something’ 
about global warming destroy wealth and are ineffective”). 
191 See Kahan & Braman, supra note 6, at 150. 
192 See Arthur Lupia, Who Can Persuade Whom?  Implications from the Nexus of Psycholo-
gy and Rational Choice Theory (arguing that “a cueseeker’s perception of a cue-giver’s 
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view as credible in this sense are ones who share their worldviews—and 
who, as a result, face similar psychological and emotional pressure to 
favor conclusions congenial to their basic moral outlooks.193  Seeing 
that these debates, though overtly focused on disputed issues of fact, 
pit those who share their cultural style against those whom they know 
harbor competing commitments, citizens on each side dismissively re-
ject the empirical claims of the others as the product of bad faith and 
self-delusion.194 
The symbolic cultural dispute that the “no means . . . ?” debate 
most closely resembles is the one over abortion.  That controversy, 
Kristin Luker has shown, does not pit men against women so much as 
it pits women of one cultural style against women of another.  Those 
on the “pro-life” side consist disproportionately of women committed 
to hierarchical norms that confer esteem on women who successfully 
master domestic roles such as wife and mother.  They see abortion 
rights as denigrating those norms and thus as threatening their status:  
“abortion on demand” connotes a societal commitment to enabling 
women to escape the constraints motherhood places on the pursuit of 
professional and market success and to enjoy the pleasure of sex out-
side of relationships in which women are dependent on men.  Because 
abortion rights bear these social meanings, moreover, “pro-choice” ac-
tivists consist disproportionately of women committed to an egalitarian 
style.195  These are, of course, the same groups of women in conflict 
over rape-law reform.  Their conflicting values are admittedly closer to 
the surface in their dispute over abortion than in their dispute over 
acquaintance rape.  Nonetheless, even in the former context they (and 
to a lesser extent the men who share their cultural values) are divided 
on policy-consequential facts such as whether abortion poses mental or 
physical health risks to women and whether removing legal restrictions 
on it deters crime.196 
 
knowledge and interests affects a statement’s persuasiveness”), in THINKING ABOUT PO-
LITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 51, 57 ( James H. Kuklinski ed., 2002). 
193 See Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil & Slovic, supra note 108. 
194 See, e.g., GORE, supra note 190, at 242-44 (arguing that public discourse in the 
United States has become less focused and reasoned); SPENCER, supra note 190, at 85-
102 (depicting the lack of constructive dialogue in the global-warming debate). 
195 See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 176 (1984) 
(asserting that from a pro-choice activist’s point of view, reproductive rights and con-
trol are essential for women to be treated as equals). 
196 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 7, at 489-90 (presenting 
evidence that hierarchical women are predisposed to see health risks from abortion); 
see also John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 
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Cultural conflicts over facts pose a distinctive challenge to the fun-
damental commitments of a liberal political order.  On one influential 
account of liberalism, the state is forbidden to use law as an instru-
ment for promoting a cultural orthodoxy; it must instead confine law 
to the attainment of ends that persons of diverse cultural outlooks 
could affirm, paradigmatically the prevention of harm.197  The en-
forcement of this principle, however, is not psychologically 
straightforward.  Because of cultural cognition, citizens (including 
lawmakers and judges) naturally conform their perceptions of the 
sources of harm, and of how harms can be abated, to their values.  Ac-
cordingly, even when they honestly attend to collective welfare (public 
health, national security, economic prosperity, and the like), individu-
als are naturally impelled to advocate repression of behavior that 
transgresses their moral norms.  Those subject to such regulation are 
likewise impelled to resist—both by their (psychologically naïve) per-
ception that their behavior is (obviously) benign and by their (psycho-
logically realistic) suspicion that any belief to the contrary originates in 
moral aversion to their way of life.198  The resulting competition to at-
tain the law’s endorsement of one or another culturally partisan un-
derstanding of fact impedes liberalism in exactly the same way that 
self-conscious competition to impose a cultural orthodoxy does:  by in-
vesting the outcome of policy and legal debates with a meaning that 
makes it impossible for losers to see the outcome as compatible with 
respect for their identities. 
This is the cognitively illiberal state.199  Because the disputed fac-
tual claims featured in the “no means . . . ?” conflict derive from the 
cultural identity of those advancing them, the issue of rape-law reform 
 
116 Q.J. ECON. 379, 391-407 (2001) (presenting evidence that legalizing abortion re-
duces crime). 
197 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“[N]o 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, re-
ligion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”).  See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 
51-52 (Edward Alexander ed., Broadview Press 1999) (1859) (elaborating upon the self-
protection principle); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 175, 217-18 (1993) (propos-
ing political limitations on moral conceptions of justice in order to protect democratic 
citizenship). 
198 See generally Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, Ac-
tual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal:  “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and 
Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 414 (1995) (documenting that indi-
viduals tend to correctly perceive that those who disagree with them on contentious 
issues of fact are motivated by group commitments but assume incorrectly that their 
own beliefs are free of group influence). 
199 See Kahan, supra note 10, at 117. 
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cannot be completely addressed without taking a position on how the 
law should respond to status competition of this sort. 
What position the law should take, moreover, is as open to debate 
as any other issue—whether of fact or value—in the rape-reform de-
bate.  The dilemma of cognitive illiberalism certainly cannot be 
avoided by rejecting or adopting any particular position on what the 
definition of rape should be.  As currently framed, the case for 
reform—whether the removal of the “force or threat of force” ele-
ment, the elimination of the “reasonable mistake” defense, or the 
adoption of the more radical “no means no” standard—bears unmis-
takable expressive hostility to cultural norms integral to the hierarchic 
way of life.  But opposition to reform is just as symbolic of cultural par-
tisanship, in light of the antagonism between the social meaning of the 
common law definition and egalitarian norms. 
One response would simply be for the law to pick sides.  One 
might believe, for example, that the law ought to endorse egalitarian 
norms and repudiate hierarchic ones.  If so, the only adjustment one 
would need to make in order to present a cogent and candid critique 
of the common law would be to acknowledge that imposing cultural 
orthodoxy through law justifies reform in the face of factual uncertain-
ty about whether or how such reform would influence behavior.  One 
could escape cognitive illiberalism, in other words, by becoming con-
sciously antiliberal.200 
But for citizens—of any cultural persuasion—who believe the law 
should aspire to meaningful neutrality, matters are more complicated.  
Our society is reasonably well accustomed to dealing with the open in-
vocation of culturally partisan values; our political and legal discourse 
is well stocked with strategies that enable avoidance of such appeals 
and with norms that conduce to the marginalization of the expressive 
zealots who feel no compunction against resorting to them.201  The 
language we use for debating politics and law is not nearly so well 
 
200 See Dan M. Kahan, Two Liberal Fallacies in the Hate Crimes Debate, 20 LAW & PHIL. 
175, 189-92 (2001) (arguing that participants in the hate-crimes debate should adopt 
explicit expressive stances and forgo question-begging claims about harm prevention). 
201 See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT:  ON THE THEORY OF LIB-
ERAL DEMOCRACY 234 (1995) (“To win otherwise unattainable cooperation, people vo-
luntarily muzzle themselves about divisive topics.”); RAWLS, supra note 197, at 214 (ad-
vocating that “public reason” impose limits on discussions regarding “constitutional 
essentials” and “questions of basic justice”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND 
POLITICAL CONFLICT 41 (1996) (explaining how “incompletely theorized agreements” 
are valuable for “reducing the political cost of enduring disagreements” and accom-
modating changes in facts or values over time). 
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equipped with idioms for steering the state away from endorsement of 
culturally partisan perceptions of fact.  Indeed, one of the devices legal 
and political actors routinely use to try to mute overt reliance on parti-
san values—the use of consequentialist frameworks (“deterrence,” 
“cost-benefit analysis,” “efficiency”) that elide contested social mean-
ings—is exactly what creates the polarization over facts that  
thereby become infused with cultural significance.202 
Ironically, the best response to cognitive illiberalism, in this setting 
and in others, might involve the inversion of the usual remedy for con-
scious illiberalism.  Whereas “public reason”—the paramount liberal 
discourse norm—prescribes denuding the law of social meaning as a 
strategy for inoculating it from culturally partisan values, the way to 
protect the law from the pathologies associated with endorsement of 
culturally partisan perceptions of fact might be to multiply such mean-
ings.  By striving to formulate laws in a manner that admits of a variety 
of potential—even potentially contradictory—cultural justifications, 
officials can furnish persons of diverse persuasions with the resources 
necessary to see affirmation of their identities no matter what position 
the law takes.203  The strategic ambiguity of the Pennsylvania legislature 
after Berkowitz might well harbor, from a liberal standpoint, a morally 
commendable form of obfuscation. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has described a study aimed at investigating the con-
tribution that cultural cognition makes to the controversy over how 
the law should respond to acquaintance rape.  The results of the study 
suggest that common understandings of the nature of that dispute and 
what’s at stake in it are in need of substantial revision. 
All of the major positions, the study found, misapprehend the 
source of the “no means . . . ?” debate.  Disagreement over the signific-
ance the law should assign to the word “no” is not rooted in the self-
serving perceptions of men conditioned to disregard women’s sexual 
autonomy.  Nor is it a result of predictable misunderstanding incident 
to conventional indirection (or even misdirection) in the communica-
 
202 See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
413, 415 (1999) (suggesting that the value of deterrence is really “to quiet illiberal con-
flict between contending cultural styles and moral outlooks”). 
203 See Kahan, supra note 10, at 145-53 (defending expressive overdetermination, a 
new discourse norm that “seeks to contain cognitive illiberalism not by stripping it of 
partisan social meanings but by infusing it with so many that every cultural group can 
find affirmation of its worldviews within it”). 
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tion of consent to sex.  Rather it is the product, primarily, of identity-
protective cognition on the part of women (particularly older ones) who 
subscribe to a hierarchic cultural style.  The status of these women is 
tied to their conformity to norms that forbid the indulgence of female 
sexual desire outside of roles supportive of, and subordinate to, ap-
propriately credentialed men.  From this perspective, token resistance 
is a strategy certain women who are insufficiently committed to these 
norms use to try to disguise their deviance.  Because these women are 
understood to be misappropriating the status of women who are high-
ly committed to hierarchical norms, the latter are highly motivated—
more so even than hierarchical men—to see “no” as meaning “yes,” 
and to demand that the law respond in a way (acquittal in acquain-
tance-rape cases) that clearly communicates the morally deficient cha-
racter of women who indulge inappropriate sexual desire. 
This account also unsettles the major normative positions in the 
“no means . . . ?” debate.  Because older, hierarchical women are the 
persons most likely to misattribute consent to a woman who says “no” 
and means it, abolishing the common law’s “force or threat of force” 
element and its “reasonable mistake” defense would not create tre-
mendous jeopardy for convention-following men.  Nevertheless, there 
is also little reason to believe that these reforms would enhance the 
sexual autonomy of women whose verbal resistance would otherwise 
be ignored.  Cultural predispositions, the study found, exert such a 
powerful influence over perceptions of consent and other legally con-
sequential facts that no change in the definition of rape is likely to af-
fect results. 
This conclusion, however, does not imply that the outcome of the 
“no means . . . ?” debate is of no moment.  On the contrary, the role of 
cultural cognition helps to explain why the debate has persisted at 
such an intense level for so long.  The powerful tendency of those on 
both sides to conform their perceptions of fact to their values suggests 
why thirty years worth of experience has not come close to forging 
consensus on what the consequences of reform truly are.  Over the 
course of this period, the constancy of the cultural identities of those 
who plainly see one answer in the data and those who just as plainly 
see another has driven those on both sides to form their only shared 
perception:  that the position the law takes will declare the winner in a 
battle for cultural predominance. 
This particular battle, moreover, occupies only a single theater in a 
multifront war.  Like the debate over rape-law reform, continuing dis-
putes over the death penalty, gun control, and hate crimes all feature 
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clashing empirical claims advanced by culturally polarized groups who 
see the law’s acceptance or rejection of their perceptions of how 
things work as a measure of where their group stands in society.  In-
deed, the same can be said about a wide range of environmental, pub-
lic-health, economic, and national-security issues.204  It is impossible to 
formulate a satisfactory response to the debate over rape-law reform 
without engaging more generally the distinctive issues posed by illiber-
al status conflict over legally consequential facts. 
 
204 See Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 NATURE 296 (2010). 
15 KAHAN FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2010  6:10 PM 
2010] Culture, Cognition, and Consent 807 
APPENDIX:  STUDY INSTRUMENT 
A.  Vignette 
Now we would like to know how you would evaluate the evidence 
presented in a criminal rape trial.  The summary of the evidence is tak-
en from a court opinion.  The names of the parties have been changed.  
After you read a summary of the evidence, we will ask you how you 
would assess the facts and decide the case if you were on the jury. 
1.  The Case 
Dave, age twenty, and Lucy, age nineteen, are both college so-
phomores.  Dave is accused of raping Lucy in his dormitory room.  
The key evidence consists of Dave’s and Lucy’s respective accounts of 
what happened. 
2.  Summary of Lucy’s Testimony 
Lucy and Dave have mutual friends and acquaintances, and had in-
teracted with one another on various occasions.  One such occasion was 
roughly two weeks before the alleged rape, after Lucy and some friends 
attended a school-wide seminar on sexual assault entitled, “Does ‘No’ 
Sometimes Mean ‘Yes’?”  After the seminar, Lucy and several of her 
friends discussed the seminar over a speaker-phone with Dave and 
Dave’s roommate Evan.  During that conversation, someone brought up 
that a lecturer at the seminar had described the average size of a man’s 
penis.  Lucy asked Dave what his penis size was.  Dave responded by sug-
gesting that she “come over and find out.”  Lucy declined. 
On two other occasions, Lucy had stopped by Dave and Evan’s 
dormitory room while intoxicated.  During one of those times, she had 
laid down on Dave’s bed.  Questioned whether she had asked Dave 
how large his penis was then, Lucy said she did not remember. 
At roughly 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon of the alleged sexual as-
sault, Lucy returned to her dormitory room after attending class.  She 
had a Martini to “loosen up a little bit,” she explained, before going to 
meet her boyfriend, with whom she had argued the night before.  
When she walked to her boyfriend’s dormitory lounge ten minutes lat-
er, he had not yet arrived. 
Having “nothing else to do” while she waited for her boyfriend, 
Lucy decided to go to Dave’s room to look for Evan.  She knocked on 
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the door several times but received no answer.  So she decided to write 
a note to Evan, which read, “Hi Evan, I’m drunk.  That’s not why I 
came to see you.  I haven’t seen you in a while.  I’ll talk to you later.”  
She testified that in fact she had not felt any intoxicating effects from 
her alcoholic drink, and had written the note “for a laugh.” 
Lucy tried the knob on Dave’s door and, finding it open, walked 
in.  She saw someone lying on the bed with a pillow over his head, 
whom she thought was Evan.  After lifting the pillow, she realized it 
was Dave.  She asked Dave which dresser was Evan’s.  He told her, and 
Lucy left the note. 
As she turned to the door, Dave asked her to stay and “hang out for 
a while.”  She agreed because she “had time to kill” and because she 
didn’t really know Dave and wanted to give him “a fair chance.”  Dave 
asked her to give him a backrub but she declined, explaining that she 
did not “trust” him.  Dave then asked her to have a seat on his bed.  In-
stead, she sat on the floor and talked with him.  During the conversa-
tion, Lucy explained she was having problems with her boyfriend. 
After about ten minutes, Dave moved off the bed and onto the 
floor, and, according to Lucy, “kind of pushed me back with his body.  
It wasn’t a shove, it was just kind of a leaning-type of thing.”  Next, 
Dave “straddled” and started kissing Lucy.  Lucy responded by saying, 
“Look, I gotta go.  I’m going to meet my boyfriend.”  Then Dave lifted 
up Lucy’s shirt and bra and began touching her.  Lucy then said “no.” 
Lucy testified that after roughly thirty seconds of kissing and 
touching, Dave “undid his pants, and he kind of moved his body up a 
little bit.”  Lucy was still saying “no” but testified she “really couldn’t 
move because Dave was shifting his body so he was over me.”  Dave 
then tried to put his penis in her mouth.  Lucy did not physically res-
ist, but rather continued to verbally protest, saying “No, I gotta go, let 
me go,” in what she described as a “scolding” manner. 
Ten or fifteen more seconds passed before the two rose to their 
feet.  Dave disregarded Lucy’s repeated complaints that she “had to 
go,” and instead walked several feet away to the door and locked it so 
that no one from the outside could enter.  Lucy testified that she rea-
lized at the time that the lock was not of a type that could lock people 
inside the room. 
Then, in Lucy’s words, “Dave put me down on the bed.  It was kind 
of like—he didn’t throw me on the bed.  It’s hard to explain.  It was 
kind of like a push but no . . . .”  She did not bounce off the bed.  “It 
wasn’t slow like a romantic kind of thing, but it wasn’t a fast shove ei-
ther.  It was kind of in the middle.” 
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Once Lucy was on the bed, Dave began “straddling” her again while 
he undid the knot in her sweatpants.  After removing her sweatpants 
and underwear from one of her legs, he used one of his hands to 
“guide” his penis into her vagina.  Lucy testified that as these actions 
took place she repeatedly said “‘no, no’ to him softly in a moaning kind 
of way because it was just so scary.”  Lucy did not physically resist while 
on the bed because Dave was on top of her, and she “couldn’t like go 
anywhere.”  She did not scream out at anytime because, “it was like a 
dream was happening or something.”  After about thirty seconds, Dave 
pulled out his penis and ejaculated onto Lucy’s stomach. 
Immediately thereafter, Dave got off Lucy and said, “Wow, I guess 
we just got carried away.”  Lucy responded, “No, we didn’t get carried 
away, you got carried away.”  Lucy then quickly dressed, grabbed her 
school books and immediately went downstairs to meet her boyfriend 
who was by then waiting for her in the lounge. 
Once there, Lucy began crying.  She went with her boyfriend to his 
dorm room where, after watching Lucy clean off Dave’s semen from 
her stomach, her boyfriend called the police. 
3.  Summary of Dave’s Testimony 
Dave offered his own account of the incident.  Dave agreed that he 
initiated physical contact, but maintained that Lucy responded by 
“passionately” returning his kisses.  He also admitted that Lucy was 
continually “whispering ‘no’s,’” but claimed that she did so while 
“amorously and passionately moaning.”  Dave testified that he con-
strued Lucy’s words and actions as encouraging him to continue.  
When asked why he locked the door, he stated that “that’s not some-
thing you want somebody to just walk in on you doing.” 
According to Dave, Lucy “reclined backwards onto the bed” as he 
“leaned into” her.  He testified that Lucy shifted and turned her body 
in a manner that helped him to remove her clothing and insert his 
penis into her vagina.  He agreed that Lucy continued to say “no” 
while on the bed, but explained the statements were “moaned passio-
nately.”  According to Dave, when he saw a “blank look on Lucy’s 
face,” he immediately withdrew and asked “is anything wrong, is some-
thing the matter, is anything wrong.”  He then ejaculated on her sto-
mach because, he said, he could no longer “control” himself.  Dave 
testified that Lucy then “got right off the bed—she just swings her legs 
over and then she puts her clothes back on.”  Corroborating Lucy’s 
account, he testified that he then remarked, “Well, I guess we got car-
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ried away,” to which she replied, “No, we didn’t get carried, you got 
carried away.” 
B.  Experimental Conditions:  Legal Instructions 
1.  No-Definition Condition 
[Proceed to Part III.] 
2.  Common-Law Condition 
a.  Legal Rules 
The following legal rules apply in this case: 
i.  Rape 
A man is guilty of rape if he (a) uses force or the threat of force 
(b) to engage in sexual intercourse with a woman (c) without the 
woman’s consent and (d) knows or can reasonably be expected to 
know the woman does not consent. 
ii.  Sexual Intercourse 
As used in the above definition of rape, “sexual intercourse” 
means the penetration of a woman’s vagina by a man’s penis. 
3.  Strict-Liability Condition 
a.  Legal Rules 
The following legal rules apply in this case: 
i.  Rape 
A man is guilty of rape if he (a) uses force or the threat of force 
(b) to engage in sexual intercourse with a woman (c) without the 
woman’s consent. 
ii.  Sexual Intercourse 
As used in the above definition of rape, “sexual intercourse” 
means the penetration of a woman’s vagina by a man’s penis. 
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iii.  Mistake 
If a man engages in conduct that satisfies the above definition of 
rape, a mistaken belief that the woman consented is not a defense. 
4.  Reform Condition 
a.  Legal Rules 
The following legal rules apply in this case: 
i.  Rape 
A man is guilty of rape if he (a) engages in sexual intercourse with 
a woman (b) without the woman’s consent. 
ii.  Sexual intercourse 
As used in the above definition of rape, “sexual intercourse” 
means the penetration of a woman’s vagina by a man’s penis. 
iii.  Consent 
As used in the above definition of rape, “consent” means words 
or overt actions indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual 
intercourse. 
iv.  Mistake 
If a man engages in conduct that satisfies the above definition of 
rape, a mistaken belief that the woman consented is not a defense. 
5.  No-Means-No Condition 
a.  Legal Rules 
The following legal rules apply in this case: 
i.  Rape 
A man is guilty of rape if he (a) engages in sexual intercourse with 
a woman (b) without the woman’s consent. 
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ii.  Sexual Intercourse 
As used in the above definition of rape, “sexual intercourse” 
means the penetration of a woman’s vagina by a man’s penis. 
iii.  Without the Woman’s Consent 
As used in the above definition of rape, sexual intercourse is 
“without the woman’s consent” if the woman communicates by actions 
or by words, including the uttering of the word “no,” that she does not 
consent to sexual intercourse. 
iv.  Mistake 
If a man engages in conduct that satisfies the above definition of 
rape, and if he knows that the woman has said “no,” a mistaken belief 
that the woman consented is not a defense. 
C.  Response Items 
Now you will read certain statements relating to the case.  In some 
of the statements, the term “sexual intercourse” is used.  As used in 
these statements, “sexual intercourse” means the penetration of a 
woman’s vagina by a man’s penis.  Please indicate how strongly you 
disagree or agree with these statements.  [The options are:  strongly 
disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, mod-
erately agree, and strongly agree.]  If you need to refer back to either 
the summary of the trial testimony or to the legal rules, you may do so. 
1.  Fact Items [Randomized Order] 
CONSENT.  Despite what she said or might have felt after, Lucy 
really did consent to sexual intercourse with Dave. 
NOCONSENT.  Dave engaged in sexual intercourse with Lucy 
without her consent. 
HONEST.  Dave believed that Lucy consented to sexual inter-
course. 
REASONABLE.  Given all the circumstances, it would have been 
reasonable for Dave to believe Lucy consented to sexual intercourse. 
DISHONEST.  Dave knew that Lucy had not consented to sexual 
intercourse with him. 
FORCE.  Dave used force to overcome Lucy’s lack of consent to 
sexual intercourse. 
15 KAHAN FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2010  6:10 PM 
2010] Culture, Cognition, and Consent 813 
THREATENING.  Dave’s threatening behavior would have made a 
woman in Lucy’s situation too frightened to use physical resistance to 
try to stop him from engaging in sexual intercourse with her. 
NOMEANSNO.  By saying “no” several times, Lucy made it clear to 
Dave that she did not consent to sexual intercourse. 
NOTLEAVE.  Lucy would have tried to leave the dormitory room 
if she had really meant not to consent to sexual intercourse. 
NORESIST.  Lucy would have tried to push Dave off of her if she 
had really meant not to consent to sexual intercourse. 
TRUECHARGE.  There is no reason to believe Lucy would falsely 
accuse Dave of rape. 
UNFAIR.  It would be unfair to convict Dave of a crime as serious 
as rape. 
2.  Outcome Item 
GUILTY.  Dave should be found guilty of rape. 
 
